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From the Editor 
Science-and-theology between secularization and postmodernism 
Years ago, this Bulletin often reported on conferences and workshops 
organized to deal with issues in our field and to offer updated approaches to 
the topics of our interest. The task was difficult and few colleagues were 
ready to engage in such a demanding exercise. As a result that section has 
been fading away, and finally just our ECSR is being systematically re-
ported. 
However, last end July I attended an interesting conference organized 
by the Ian Ramsey Centre for Science and Religion in Oxford. The general 
title was: “A Postsecular Age? New Narratives on Religion, Science and 
Society”. The issue of science and secularization is highly relevant for the 
dialogue between science and theology. Indeed, if Max Weber’s thesis 
about the strong secularizing effect of science proves true, this would be 
bad news for us. The thesis points to some corrosive effect on religious be-
liefs by science diffusion. Science as an ‘acid’ is an image quite frequently 
used, most recently perhaps by Daniel Dennett and applied to evolutionary 
theory.  
The question now is whether we enter a different stage in the relation-
ship between science and religion in which the dominant negative outcome 
gives place to a more complex reality in which scientific development does 
not necessarily result in religious retreat, but in new integration and even in 
renewed religious or spiritual outlooks. The abused label ‘postsecular’ 
somewhat announces this new stage and a change in the old ways in which 
scientific and economic progress would mean a decline in religious figures. 
However, the Oxford Conference revolved around a more postmodern 
stance and devoted many presentations to the way the ‘religious’ and the 
‘secular’ are narrated, or even ‘constructed’. Such a move led me – and oth-
ers – to think about the use of postmodern approaches to science-and-
theology. Several books have been published applying that perspective. 
Somehow they try to deconstruct the dominant ‘narratives’ or ways to pre-
sent the current tensions, and to show alternative paths in which science and 
religious faith can be described in a completely different fashion. 
I remain unconvinced about such an approach and its utility for the dia-
logue between science and theology. This is a personal opinion and it 
would be worthwhile to start some debate concerning that issue. I am not 
the only one. Our colleague Jay Feierman offers in this issue a review of a 
new title by Shaefer that follows a similar path. He reviewed recently an-
other book by Graham Ward, and in that case too he showed his disquiet in 
the face of views hard to digest for a scientifically formed mentality. An-
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other example was the book by Cunningham Darwin’s Pious Idea, here re-
viewed by Neil Spurway, and that I have to review for a different Journal. 
This book caused some stir in us because of the author’s exaggerated flexi-
bility at interpreting evolution and its theological reception, again in a 
postmodern mood. 
My point is that we have to pay attention to such developments, but I 
am not sure whether they really help to improve the level of the ongoing 
debates and the very demanding task we are involved trying to learn from 
science to update theological elaboration; or trying to learn from theology 
as an inspiration for scientific research. There are urgent tasks looking for 
good proposals, and postmodern thinking appears limited, especially if we 
choose to follow the rigorous and demanding epistemological conditions 
that are the hallmark of science, and a healthy corrective to rhetorical abuse 
or excessive idealism. 
The current issue offers an extensive review describing the ongoing 
discussion on free will. This is a highly relevant issue for us, since the im-
plications derived from assuming or opposing free will are huge for the un-
derstanding of human beings and many theological principles. This is, be-
sides, a typical question where science, philosophy and theology are deeply 
intermingled, and hence becomes a ground for an excellent interdisciplinary 
exercise, The young Finish scholar Aku Visala is an expert in this field and 




















Free Will, Moral Responsibility and the Sciences: A Brief Overview 
Aku Visala, Academy Research Fellow, University of Helsinki 
There are many problems related to free will, not just one.1 We have a 
number of interrelated questions and issues that have to do with how we see 
ourselves in relation to the physical world. How do our actions come about? 
How much influence do we have on our characters? Are my thoughts de-
termined by non-conscious brain events? Can I be responsible for my ac-
tions, if the causes of my actions are beyond my control? Given what we 
know about how physical nature and our brains work, can we offer scien-
tific answers to such questions at all?  
What I will offer you next is an overview of recent debates about free 
will and science. I will begin by framing the debate in a non-standard way 
by dividing the positions on the table into three different groups. I will then 
go on to introduce a few accounts of free will and responsibility from each 
camp.  
A Clash of Two Pictures  
As I already mentioned, there are many problems and issues that are 
discussed in the free will literature. I think that the debates can be best un-
derstood, if framed in the following way. Questions about free will and 
moral responsibility have their roots in attempts to reconcile two pictures 
we quite intuitively have: the first is of physical nature and the second of 
ourselves.2 The first picture is a somewhat simplified interpretation derived 
from the physical sciences. Nature, as it is revealed to us, seems to consist 
of physical events, mechanisms and laws that govern their behaviour. 
Agent-like processes can be explained by invoking mechanisms that are 
purely physical and make no reference to minds, goals, intentions, decisions 
or values. On the basic physical level, there are no choices, intentions, deci-
sions or any kind of mental phenomena, but simple, brute causation. 
The second picture is a picture of ourselves as acting, wanting, think-
ing, rational and responsible agents. We have the capacity to adopt goals, 
                                                 
1 Useful introductions to recent philosophical debates on free will include at least 
the following: McKenna & Pereboom 2016; Beebee 2012; Fischer, et al 2007. Kane 
2011 is the most comprehensive one to date. 
2 My categorisation is inspired by some remarks made by Michael McKenna and 
Derk Pereboom (2016, 43-45).   
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choose between various ways of achieving them and understanding the con-
sequences of our actions. We are able to evaluate our reasons for wanting 
things and embarking on different courses of action. It also seems to us that 
we are, at least partly, responsible for the kinds of people we are. We have 
some basic influence over our emotions and impulses and in time we can 
shape our characters. Indeed, these reasons are why normally function 
adults in most circumstances can be held accountable for our actions: we 
blame and praise each other on the basis of our actions and characters.  
Problems with free will arise when we try to fit these two pictures to-
gether: nature (including us) as a physical system with underlying determi-
nistic physical causes and ourselves as free and responsible agents. What I 
will suggest next is that positions in the free will debate can be taken to rep-
resent three different strategies that involve relating these two pictures to 
one another. The first strategy is to eliminate, that is to reject, one of them 
completely. Usually this involves rejecting the everyday view of agency in 
favour of the scientific view. The second strategy is to insulate the two pic-
tures from one another or at least hold onto the tension and reject elimina-
tion and attempts to build a bridge between the pictures. Finally, the third 
strategy, reconciliation, aims to build a bridge between these two pictures. 
This is usually leads to attempts to “naturalize” agency and freedom in such 
a way that they are not fundamentally in conflict with our picture of the de-
terministic and mechanistic physical world.  
My characterization of the free will and science debate is an alternative 
to the standard way of classifying accounts of free will. I think it is fair to 
say that the standard classification is based on the compatibility issue. That 
is to say, it begins from the question whether free will is compatible with 
determinism. The three main positions defined along these lines are liber-
tarianism, compatibilism and free will skepticism. According to the liber-
tarians, free will and moral responsibility require determinism to be false, 
or conversely, that indeterminism is true. In addition, the libertarian main-
tains that we indeed have free will. Opposed to this, the compatibilist ar-
gues that there is no conflict between determinism and free will: we can be 
morally responsible and free even if determinism were true. Finally, there 
are free will skeptics who are critical of both compatibilism and libertarian-
ism and conclude that we have no free will or moral responsibility.  
Free Will and Determinism 
It is useful to define the two basic terms “free will” and “determinism” 
a bit more carefully. A standard definition of free will in contemporary de-
bates is that free will is a control condition for moral responsibility. So free 
will is an ability or power of persons to have control over their actions in a 
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way that allows for the attribution of moral responsibility.3 The link be-
tween free will and moral responsibility is crucial here: my actions and I 
can be appropriate objects of moral judgments and attitudes if and only if I 
have performed those actions freely and when my character traits are, in the 
appropriate sense, under my control. Conversely, I cannot be held responsi-
ble for actions I have not performed freely or character traits that are not 
under my control.  
The definition above leaves the exact nature of the kind of control one 
needs for moral responsibility open. There are many accounts of what this 
control consists of. Philosopher Alfred Mele usefully suggests that we di-
vide the proposals into three groups: free will “light”, free will regular and 
free will premium.4 Free will lite is the view that free will only requires that 
one makes rational and deliberated decisions and is not under external or 
internal compulsion or the subject of undue forces. Some philosophers, 
however, maintain that free will lite is not enough for moral responsibility: 
we need a stronger notion, free will regular. What is needed is for the world 
and our brain to be such that there are alternative possibilities open to us at 
the point of our decision. In other words, it is not enough to act rationally 
and free of compulsion but the world must exhibit deep openness so that 
our decisions can influence it. Finally, free will premium is the view that 
even deep openness is not enough: in order to exert control over our ac-
tions, our actions must be uncaused products of non-natural or supernatural 
reasons or some such. Free will premium, therefore, entails that we are 
somehow above and beyond the physical. As we will soon see, how we 
think about free will and science depends heavily on the kind of free will 
we want to defend.  
Another central term in the debate is determinism. In its simplest form, 
determinism is the thesis that at any single point in time, only one future is 
physically possible. Conversely, indeterminism is the denial of this thesis. 
There are big questions, however, that loom behind seemingly innocent 
terms like “possible” and “physically”. The basic idea can be fleshed out in 
different ways. One is to invoke something like physical causation and laws 
of nature: for every event, there is a physical cause that, in conjunction with 
the laws of nature, makes its effect necessary. So, given the laws of nature 
and the past physical events, there is only one way that the future can go. 
However, some philosophers worry about the notion of causation at work 
here, since many agree that there can be probabilistic causation. To solve 
this issue, another way of defining determinism has emerged. Here deter-
minism is understood logically rather than causally. Determinism, in this 
view, is the thesis that the set of all true propositions about the past and 
                                                 
3 McKenna & Pereboom 2016, 8. 
4 See, e.g., Mele 2014a, 1-2.  
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laws of nature at some point in time entails the truth of all sentences about 
events after that time.5   
Universal determinism outlined above is far from uncontroversial, at 
least scientifically. Quantum indeterminacy, complexity and chaotic sys-
tems theory suggest that there might be indeterminacy at the basic physical 
level. Although this might seem as good news for those who defend the the-
sis that free will is incompatible with determinism, things are not that sim-
ple. Even if indeterminism would be true on the basic physical level, we 
have good evidence that determinism, or “near-determinism” is true at the 
level of brains, social environments and other human affairs. The progress 
of biology, social sciences, neurosciences and psychology has produced 
massive amount of information about the genetic, cognitive, social and neu-
rological causes of human behaviour. The kinds of causes of human action 
these approaches have been finding are still outside the control of individ-
ual persons. So the main issue, I would contend, is not really whether de-
terminism or indeterminism is supported by contemporary physics, but 
rather the suggestion of contemporary neurosciences and biology that there 
are many different kinds of non-voluntary causes that influence our deci-
sions and actions.   
Strategy I: Elimination 
One strategy to resolve free will problems is to eliminate our everyday 
picture of agency, responsibility and free will. The main reason for elimina-
tion is the ever-increasing scientific knowledge about the determinants of 
human behaviour. The most important ones are neuroscientific results that 
suggest that conscious decisions to act are never the causes of our actions.  
Eliminativist approaches are usually more popular among scientists 
than philosophers. Of the three eliminativists that I will briefly mention 
here, the first is a psychologists and the second a cognitive neuroscientist. 
The psychologist is Daniel Wegner, whose The Illusion of Free Will (2002) 
is probably the most comprehensive defence of eliminativism to date. 
Compared to Wegner’s book, Michael Gazzaniga’s Who’s in Charge? Free 
Will and the Science of the Brain (2011) is a lighter read. Gazzaniga, a cog-
nitive neuroscientist, argues that we cannot have free will with the brains 
we actually have.  
Both Wegner and Gazzaniga give a lot of evidential weight to a series 
of studies by Benjamin Libet and others. From the 70s onwards, Libet and 
others following him have conducted various experiments about the rela-
tionship of conscious decision-making and brain events. Without going into 
the details, Libet-style experiments involve the measuring of brain activity 
                                                 
5 On defining determinism, see, e.g., McKenna & Pereboom 2016, 16-24. 
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in some way (e.g., EEG, fMRI) and its timing in relation to the conscious 
decision to act. The act measured in the experiments is usually something 
like basic motor movement, like flexing of one’s hand, such as in the origi-
nal Libet experiment.6  
The standard interpretation of these results suggests that before the 
conscious decision to act, the brain has already prepared in some way for 
the decision. What Libet, as Gazzaniga and Wegner, conclude from this is 
that it is the neural activation that is causing both the action and the con-
scious decision to act. In other words, neural causes precede the action and 
make it inevitable; conscious decision to act is just an illusion or epiphe-
nomenal and does not play an active role in the causal chain. 7 For Gazza-
niga, for example, when we consciously account for our actions, we are 
providing post hoc rationalizations, that is, we invent rational reasons for 
actions that were caused by non-conscious, non-voluntary processes.  
Gazzaniga and Wegner both emphasize that in order for us to have free 
will, that is, control over our actions, we must make conscious decisions 
that somehow cut the flow of physical causation in the brain. This is cru-
cial: in order for us to have free will, we need something like non-
determined, conscious intentions or causes intervening in normal brain 
processes. Since the experiments reveal nothing like this and conscious de-
cisions to act look epiphenomenal, Gazzaniga, Wegner and others conclude 
that we have no free will.    
In addition to Libet-style studies, Wegner invokes a number of ex-
periments about illusions of agency. I do not have the space here to discuss 
these experiments in any detail.8 Suffice it to say that they reveal a few un-
comfortable facts about our sense our own agency. One is that, at least un-
der experimental settings, an illusion can be created that we are acting, 
moving our hands, for instance, when actually we are not. Another set of 
experiments that Wegner refers to has to do with social psychology. Many 
social psychology experiments, like the Milgram experiments and the Stan-
ford Prison experiment, suggests that our immediate environment, not our 
own decisions, determines our actions.9  
                                                 
6 For classical Libet experiments, see Libet 1985, 2004. More recent Libet-style 
experiments include Soon, et al 2008; Fried et al. 2011.  
7 Libet-style experiments have sparked an extensive debate about the role of 
consciousness in decision-making and action. See, e.g., Pocket, Banks, Gallagher 
2006. 
8 Wegner describes many such experiments in detail. See Wegner 2002. 
9 For Milgram’s experiments, see Milgram 1974. For Paul Zimbardo’s account of 
the Stanford Prison experiment, see Zimbardo.  
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After reviewing experimental results, Gazzaniga and Wegner make a 
crucial assumption: that all our actions are caused in the same way. It fol-
lows from this that if there are cases where we are wrong about the causes 
of our actions and decisions or are unable to comprehend their origin in the 
brain (as Gazzaniga suggests), all our actions are could be like this. In other 
words, both Gazzaniga and Wegner suggest that their results apply to all 
human actions, not just the relatively simple actions the studies are about 
(moving of hands, etc.). None of our actions are products of conscious rea-
sons, but are instead caused by factors outside our control and conscious 
awareness (brain processes, social environment).   
Finally, let me introduce one philosopher, who is an eliminativist: Derk 
Pereboom. To begin, Pereboom sides with the libertarians: if determinism 
were true, we could not be free or morally responsible. After arguing for 
this conclusion (via a series of arguments from certain kinds of manipula-
tion cases I will not address here), he goes on to criticize the alternatives to 
free will skepticism. Pereboom maintains that libertarian accounts have no 
reasonable answer to the problem of luck: if indeterminism were true, ra-
tional action would be equally problematic, because genuine indeterminism 
means randomness and randomly caused actions cannot be considered ra-
tional. So Pereboom concludes that we should reject free will and moral re-
sponsibility.  
 According to Pereboom, the main problem for eliminativists is not 
strictly speaking philosophical or scientific, but practical and ethical. 10 
How to live without free will and moral responsibility? Gazzaniga thinks 
living without free will is not a problem, because we can still be morally 
responsible. Many philosophers, however, consider the link between moral 
responsibility and free will rather solid: if free will goes, moral responsibil-
ity goes as well. This is exactly how Pereboom sees it and in his Living 
without Free Will (2001) and Free Will, Agency and Meaning of Life (2014) 
suggests ways in which many of our everyday practices of moral praising 
and blaming, punishment and reward could survive without basic moral re-
sponsibility. Not only are such practices undermined by free will skepticism 
but the challenge goes much deeper: what are we to make about love, per-
sonhood, meaning of life and friendship without moral responsibility and 
freedom? Pereboom addresses all these issues and his basic strategy is to try 
to show most of our valuable practices and life-goals do not require basic 
moral responsibility but can be maintained for some other valuable reason. 
For instance, punishment can be justified by referring to its beneficial ef-
fects. Similarly, our practices of blaming and praising can continue because 
                                                 
10 Other free will skeptics in include Galen Strawson (1986), Ted Honderich (1988) 
and Saul Smilansky (2000).  
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they serve the goal of shaping individuals towards morally desirable direc-
tions.11   
Strategy II: Insulation 
The insulation strategy has it roots in a famous paper “Freedom and 
Resentment” (1962) by philosopher Peter Strawson and his subsequent de-
velopment of what is sometimes called the multiple viewpoints argument. 
After describing the free will debate like I did above – that is, a clash of the 
scientific picture of the physical world and our everyday picture of free 
agency – Strawson suggests that these pictures represent something like two 
viewpoints upon the same subject matter. They give us access to different 
aspects of reality. So, on the one hand, we are indeed describable and ex-
plainable scientifically. But, on the other hand, the everyday picture opens 
us up to different kinds of facts about ourselves. Truths from each perspec-
tive, according to Strawson, cannot be used to justify or discredit the truths 
of the other perspective. Thus, we can hold onto both pictures at the same 
time: as parts of physical nature, we are like all other physical beings; as 
parts of a human world of reason, mind and morality, we can be viewed as 
free and responsible.  
Another version of the insulation strategy closely resembling Straw-
son’s is developed by philosopher Roger Scruton and neurologist Raymond 
Tallis.12 Both Scruton and Tallis emphasize that human beings can be 
viewed from two points of view: as human organisms whose operations can 
be explained along the lines of the physical picture, and as persons. When 
we view humans as persons, we bring in concepts that do not really map 
onto the explanations of the physical and behavioural sciences. We use 
teleological and intentional notions like reason, consciousness, responsibil-
ity, duty, purpose and meaning that are personal and moral, not scientific.    
Free will, on this view, is the human capacity to “own” one's actions 
and take one’s actions as representing what one is. Free actions are, thus, 
actions that can be made sense of in terms of a person's reasons to act. Fur-
thermore, because reasons and purposes are not causal notions, they cannot 
be made sense of in scientific, physicalist terms. Thus, all attempts to see 
human free actions in purely causal, neuroscientific terms will fail: they 
remove the whole context of meaningful action and the agent's reasons for 
acting thus losing the possibility to judge whether an action was free or not. 
Given this, it is no surprise that Gazzaniga and others cannot see a mean-
                                                 
11 A short summary of Pereboom’s account of living without free will can be found 
in McKenna & Pereboom 2016, 276-284 
12 Scruton presents his view in many different places. See, for instance, Scruton 
2012. Tallis’ views can be found in Tallis 2011.  
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ingful difference between conscious free actions and non-conscious actions 
at the level of the brain.  
The work of philosopher Alfred Mele can be taken to represent the in-
sulationist strategy. Mele’s aim is to demonstrate that scientific results do 
not warrant the eliminativist conclusion. Mele’s work, developed in the 
context of action theory, philosophy of mind and the free will debate, is the 
gold standard for all the work so far on free will and science. His main 
books include Autonomous Agents (1995), Effective Intentions: The Power 
of Conscious Will (2009) and Free Will and Luck (2006).13 Mele does be-
lieve that we have free will but is willing to settle, if needed, for free will 
light. As to the issue of libertarianism versus compatibilism, he remains an 
agnostic. 
 Mele’s response to Libet-style experiments is that the activation of the 
brain’s readiness potential before the conscious awareness of the decision 
could be explained in many different ways than assuming that the readiness 
potential in fact represents the brain already having made the decision. The 
activation of the potential could be seen as, for instance, the brains way of 
preparing to make a decision. Nothing in Libet-style experiments rules this 
possibility out.  
Mele also points out that Gazzaniga and others offer no reasons for the 
thesis that we can generalize over all actions on the basis of experimental 
results. Morally relevant actions in our everyday life seem to be quite dif-
ferent than random decisions to flex one’s wrist in experimental settings. 
They often involve conscious deliberation, being attentive to reasons for 
different courses of actions and a number of complex social emotions. To 
emphasize this point, Mele draws attention to the actual instructions given 
to the participants of Libet-style studies. The tasks are, for the most part, 
random hand movements or pickings. It is questionable whether such ran-
dom pickings even qualify as intentional actions compared to rich and 
complex moral actions of everyday life. So it seems that generalizing from 
results of this kind is unwarranted.  
 One of Mele’s central points against the eliminativists is that they set 
the bar for free will extremely high. Recall how both Wegner and Gazza-
niga assumed that in order to have free will, one must have some kind of 
non-physical influence on one’s brain states. This account of free will is 
what I earlier dubbed as free will premium. So if the only option of the de-
fender of free will is to be a mind/body dualist, no surprise that Wegner and 
Gazzaniga see very little prospects for free will! What Mele points out is 
that we have no reason to accept such a high standard. Why not settle for 
                                                 
13 He popularizes his view in some of his later works, like Mele 2014a, 2014b.  
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free will regular or even free will light? Gazzaniga and Wegner give no ar-
gument why they adopt free will premium and offer no argument against 
free will regular or light. This is curious, Mele contends, because both light 
and regular free will might be quite compatible with what, for instance, 
Gazzaniga says about brain functioning.  
Finally, a very robust, way of following the insulationist line is to 
maintain that the physical picture of nature is incomplete or at least not 
fundamental. Most often mind/body dualists maintain that for us to have 
control over our actions requires that our actions are partly uncaused physi-
cally and have their source in something beyond the physical, namely, the 
soul or the self. One such dualist and libertarian is philosopher Richard 
Swinburne. In his book, Mind, Brain & Free Will (2013) he argues that be-
cause it is highly unlikely that the sciences will ever develop laws and ex-
planations that can deterministically explain human behaviour, it is likely 
that there is something else at work in human action than simple physical 
causation. Swinburne thinks that this something else is the agent herself: we 
are non-physical souls that can exert control over our actions in ways that 
are scientifically unpredictable. We do this controlling when we decide to 
perform an action in a situation where our desires and goals are, roughly 
speaking, of equal weight.  
So on Swinburne’s view, our free will consists of having a non-natural 
power to weight-in on difficult decisions. For the most part, our decisions 
flow from our emotions, reasons and desires. Sometimes, however, we en-
counter situations where we are uncertain, difficult moral problems that re-
quire conscious deliberation, for instance. In such situations, we might have 
good reasons for a number of different, but equally possible courses of ac-
tion. This is where the soul comes to play: it decides which course of action 
to follow and that in turn influences the kinds of desires and beliefs the 
agent has in the future. Without this kind of influence, Swinburne main-
tains, we could not be held morally responsible.  
Strategy III: Reconciliation 
By reconciliation, I refer to attempts to reduce our picture of ourselves 
as agents to the standard picture of the physical world or vice versa. Under 
this description, the reconciler is in the business of building a bridge be-
tween the two pictures in such a way that as little as possible is modified or 
reworked in each.  
In the free will debate, there is a very large group of theories and ap-
proaches that are standardly labeled as compatibilist. Compatibilism comes 
in many forms but they are all in agreement that the standard, deterministic 
picture of the physical world is compatible with humans having free will 
most of the time. So the compatibilist will argue that even if determinism 
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were true, we could be in control of our actions. The compatibilists often go 
for something like free will light: having free will does not require deep 
openness, a power to act otherwise or having ultimate control over the 
causes of one’s actions. It is enough that our actions follow somewhat uni-
fied psychological structures (beliefs, desires and goals) and that we exhibit 
responsiveness to reasons. In the last decade, compatibilist theories have 
multiplied very quickly and we currently have at least a dozen or so con-
tenders.14   
One main group of compatibilism is called reasons-responsive theo-
ries, which have been developed, for instance, by John Martin Fischer and 
Mark Ravizza in their joint book Responsibility and Control: An Essay on 
Moral Responsbility (1998).15 The main idea behind reasons-responsive 
theories is that an action is free when the agent is performing the action in a 
rational way. This means, among other things, that the agent takes into ac-
count her goals, reasonable ways of getting to those goals and is able to re-
flect reasons for and against the appropriateness of her actions. People act-
ing on compulsive desires, like addicts or severely mentally ill, would not 
qualify as having free will in this sense. Similarly, actions springing from 
phobias or psychoses would not be free. However, most of our everyday 
actions, like my taking a bus to work this morning, would qualify as free, 
because if I had been presented with some reasons why the bus was a bad 
idea this morning, I would have taken another bus, or a taxi. This is a very 
simplified example, but the basic idea is there: my action of taking the bus 
can be said to be free because it exhibits a basic responsiveness to reasons. 
Notice, again, that this way of understanding free action does not require 
that the person would have access to genuine, deep alternatives, so it is 
compatible with determinism. 
Philosopher Daniel Dennett has put forward an influential compati-
bilist theory that, to some extent, resembles reasons-responsive theories. 
Dennett’s account has been developed over a long period of time (from the 
early 80s onwards) and he has been deeply involved with the philosophical 
debate. It attempts to be interdisciplinary and take into account scientific 
results: not just Libet-style neuroscientific results (with which Dennett is 
not impressed), but locating free will in a network of psychological, evolu-
tionary and biological accounts of agency, human mind and consciousness. 
Dennett develops his views in a number of books including his recently re-
                                                 
14 McKenna & Pereboom (2016) introduces 10 compatibilist theories. Currently 
influential accounts include Carolina Sartorio’s (2016), Gary Watson’s (2004), 
Dana Nelkin’s (2011) and Kadri Vihvelin’s (2011) theories. 
15 Fischer has defended and developed the view in his later works. See, e.g., Fischer 
2012.  
ESSSAT News & Reviews, 26-3 September 2016                         15 
 
printed and revised classic Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth 
Wanting (2015, orig. 1984).  
Dennett begins by suggesting that everyday belief-desire explanations 
of action are invaluable. We routinely explain actions by invoking goals 
and beliefs. Dennett sees this as taking a certain kind of attitude towards 
persons and other complex entities: the intentional stance. There are also 
other kinds of stances that we could adopt, the design stance (that we apply 
to tools and machines) and the physical stance (that we take towards basic 
physical entities). Like Strawson, Dennett then argues that the truth of de-
terminism would have no impact on how we apply the intentional stance. In 
other words, even if we concluded that, under the physical stance, people 
can be seen as physical entities, whose basic components operate in purely 
deterministic ways, we would still continue applying the intentional stance 
to people. The intentional stance is the best way to account for normal hu-
man behaviour regardless of whether determinism is true or not. Dennett 
thinks that it is this practical applicability of the intentional stance that justi-
fies our attitudes of moral praise, blame, punishment and reward, not the 
other way around. In other words, we should not begin from some general 
account of persons as having souls or deep agency. We should, instead, take 
entities as people regardless of their deep metaphysical status, if the inten-
tional stance really explains and predicts their actions. Therefore, attempts 
to develop forms of agent causation or mind/body dualism to rescue free 
will are clearly off the mark, in Dennett’s mind.  
For Dennett, freedom consists of having an ability to control one’s 
conduct on the basis of rational considerations. This means that a person is 
capable of exercising free will if she has the capacities of critical self-
evaluation, self-monitoring and self-control. In his Freedom Evolves 
(2003), Dennett goes on to argue how such capacities could evolve from 
simpler capacities that many non-human animals have. The difference be-
tween highly developed capacities of humans and the more basic capacities 
of simple animals, such as insects, is that humans are able to adjust their 
goal-directed behaviour flexibly in different environments. For most simple 
animals, behaviour is mechanistically caused by the triggering stimuli. This 
is the case even in situations where the hard-wired behaviour might be 
wholly inappropriate and lead to death. Humans, however, can adjust, 
evaluate and improve their behaviour taking into account multiple sources 
of information: culture, environment, other people, goals, and so on. Beings 
of this kind would, clearly, have an enormous adaptive advantage over sim-
pler beings, such as insects.      
Another ambitious account following the reconciliation strategy is that 
of philosopher Nancey Murphy and neurobiologist Warren Brown. In their 
book Did My Neurons Make Me Do It? Philosophical and Neurobiological 
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Perspectives on Moral Responsibility and Free Will (2007), they argue 
against neurobiological determinism and reductionism and maintain that 
human have free will in the sense of free will light: human agents have the 
capacity to influence and redesign their own character and actions to such 
an extent as to be morally responsible. They borrow their criterion for free-
dom and responsibility from Alasdair McIntyre (2001) who maintains that 
free will is based on the capacity to evaluate one’s reasons for acting in the 
light of the concept of the good. Not unlike Dennett, Murphy and Brown 
then go on to explore the kinds of basic cognitive capacities a being needs 
to be able to act freely in this sense. They maintain that one would need at 
least a sense of self, the ability to create and evaluate counterfactual scenar-
ios, predict the future and a capacity for symbolic language.  
 The notion of emergence does most of the heavy lifting in the Mur-
phy-Brown account. When systems become complex enough, they develop 
features that cannot be analyzed simply by reference to the functions of 
their constituent parts. That is to say, complex systems develop emergent 
functions. These functions can, through feedback loops, have effects on the 
basic constituent parts of the organism. This downward causation, accord-
ing to Brown and Murphy, is a common feature of complex biological or-
ganisms. The human brain is exactly this kind of complex system, whose 
operations cannot be explained by invoking the basic physical level alone. 
This is how free will can emerge.  
Brown and Murphy end up adopting a view of free will that is close to 
Dennett’s view. A more ambitious way to use emergentism is by philoso-
pher Timothy O’Connor.16 O’Connor is a libertarian who thinks, unlike 
Dennett, Murphy, Brown and others, that free will is not compatible with 
determinism. He goes for something like free will regular, or even free will 
premium. On the Murphy-Brown account, we have emergent biological 
functions that make free will possible. According to O’Connor, we can 
make the scientific case for the emergence not just of functions but of 
agents. On this view, free will cannot be reduced to any kind of physicalis-
tically conceived basic function of the agent. Instead, free actions are ac-
tions that are directly caused by the agent by a special, emergent power of 
the agent that has no antecedent causal determinants. Hence, O’Connor’s 
view and other like it are usually called agent causal theories in the free 
will literature.17  
                                                 
16 See O’Connor 2002.   
17 Other contemporary agent causal theorists include Helen Steward (2014) and 
Randolph Clarke (2003). In addition to agent causal theories, there are other types 
of libertarianism, including the influential event-causal theory of Robert Kane 
(1996).  
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Here the agent causalist comes very close to adopting something like 
free will premium, where free will is thought to require a special kind of 
non-natural influence. Indeed, some of the theories I discussed under the 
label insulationist strategies, like that of Swinburne, are agent causal theo-
ries as well. What makes O’Connor’s theory different is that O’Connor 
does not want to add non-physical or non-natural souls into his account. In-
stead, he maintains that agent causal powers can be accounted for scientifi-
cally, by invoking the notion of strong emergence. This would involve 
modifying our picture of the physical world, but not denying its primacy, 
like Swinburne and others do. For O’Connor, we are real entities with 
emergent causal powers that our basic physical parts lack. We are neverthe-
less composed of nothing more than basic physical entities and forces.  
Finally, I want to briefly mention one reconciliation strategy that 
closely resembles non-reductive physicalism, but is based directly on neu-
roscientific findings. This strategy consists in looking at basic brain func-
tions and locating free will inside the brain. Peter Tse argues in his book 
The Neural Basis of Free Will: Criterial Causation (2013) that there is a 
special way in which neurons regulate the flow of information. This, ac-
cording to Tse, makes genuine downward mental causation possible and 
leaves space for qualia and other conscious mental phenomena to be real-
ized in the brain. Unlike Murphy and Brown, Tse thinks that the basic proc-
esses of the neurons are genuinely indeterministic and allow for not just 
free will light, for which Dennett and others settle, but for at least free will 
regular or even free will premium.   
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Incarnation between theology and science 
Niels Henrik Gregersen (ed.), Incarnation. On the Scope and Depth of 
Christology, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2015, pp. 397, ISBN: 
9781451465402; $ 44,00. 
By Sybille C. Fritsch-Oppermann 
Since Niels Henrik Gregersen introduced the idea of “Deep Christolo-
gy”, i.e. “Deep Incarnation”, to those active in the study of and exchange 
between science and theology, it has been taken up in many ways and quite 
a bit has been written about it. Also critique and reservations have been 
formulated (as for example by John Polkinghorne in the afterword to the 
present volume). 
The volume grew out of a symposium sponsored by the John Temple-
ton Foundation and organized together with the Faculty of Theology at Co-
penhagen University. It was held in Elsinore (Hamlet’s city) on August 26-
29, 2011. 
In the introduction Gregersen points to the ‘logos ensarkos’, the Logos 
incarnate in the whole creation as cosmic Christ. All those working with the 
idea of ‘Deep Incarnation’ hold in common that the dichotomy between 
particular and universal is not very helpful. Even if in Jesus in particular 
and in a unique way the particular and the universal are consistently inter-
twined, this does not exclude his relatedness to, relevance for and effect on 
other creatures. The question to be asked then is: how is he present for 
them? Active, as structuring or informational principle of cosmic evolution? 
Or passive, suffering with and standing in for (all) that is in it? (p. 8) 
The articles following this introduction, as Gregersen points out, are 
often cross-referenced. But to assist the reader’s orientation he concludes 
the introduction by presenting a very helpful typology for the different 
views of incarnation offered in Elsinore. 
PART I – Creation and Incarnation: New Testament and Early 
Church Perspectives 
Richard Bauckham reflects on the Incarnation and the Cosmic Christ, 
i.e. how the incarnate One is related to all things, and suggests that we think 
of the world in terms not only of the evolutionary process and emergence 
but also in terms of diversity and ecological inter-relatedness. Following 
this, being in Christ can be ‘unpacked’ in relational terms (no longer as a 
kind of inclusion in his human nature), which also seems to be more scien-
tifically satisfactory. 
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As the particular human Jesus is the ecological center of all creation, 
enabling all things in their inter-connectedness to find their unity and 
wholeness in relationship to God, which will be perfected as eschatological 
destiny to be realized in new creation., “The risen Christ, the firstborn of 
the new creation, is thus also the goal of creation.” (p. 57). 
Gerald O’Collins, SJ, (“Word, Spirit, and Wisdom in the Universe: a 
Biblical and Theological reflection”), suggests that we draw attention to the 
biblical material that concerns not only the Logos but also Sophia. Both are 
intelligible, ‘revelatory’ principles; their presence embedded in the informa-
tional ‘mathematical’ structures of the universe expressing its intrinsic in-
telligibility. But it also transforms things. In particular the unique beauty of 
Sophia is not only revelatory but also changes the world. Yet Sophia prom-
ises an even richer scriptural background. 
John Behr introduces to the debate Athanasius’s classic treatment of 
the topic of incarnation as a reciprocal and transforming dynamic, effected 
through the paradoxical reversal of the cross. Emphatically it is not a one-
way event located in the past but a transformation of all that to which the 
Word comes. 
Torstein Theodor Tollefsen argues that, for Saint Maximus the Confes-
sor, trying to combine Christian faith and Neo-Platonist Philosophy, i.e. 
bringing together creation and incarnation, the world had a beginning, but 
the plan of the creator did not. God’s Wisdom somehow contains the beings 
he makes and this knowledge or Wisdom is conceived in the Logos, the 2nd 
hyposthasis. It is many logoi however, keeping them together as source of 
creation, the basic ‘truth’ or reality of all beings. The divine will enter into  
this pattern since these logoi are predeterminations and acts of divine will. 
For Maximus, even though he was not a strict nominalist, universals 
disappear when particulars do. But for him there is a more powerful bond 
uniting beings: the actualization of a movement of love. Their integrity is 
thus guaranteed; a certain providential and soteriological dynamics of 
movement is made possible. 
Self-enhancement is sinful - but particularity and diversity is willed 
and as such shall not disappear in the consummation of the ages. Then sal-
vation and its concept is not limited to human beings. 
PART II – Deep Incarnation: Perspectives from Contemporary Sys-
tematic Theology. 
In a first chapter Jürgen Moltmann interprets the “God is all in all” of 
Cor.15:28 as the eschatological future of the world: “It is only in the escha-
tological end that God will be in all that is.”(p. 119) However, he urges us 
to develop anthropology in the light of cosmology. The Hebrew basar and 
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kol basar (‘flesh’ and ‘all flesh’) could then be taken even as “all beings”.  
“Like the Old Testament Shechinah, the divine Spirit indwells all the living 
so as to fill everything with primal livingness. It is the Spirit of God that 
makes hoping human beings yearn for the redemption of the body from the 
fate of death, and the oppressed nonhuman creation sigh for redemption 
from transience.” (p. 129)  
In the end however the Spirit poured out is not God incarnate and it is 
humanity which moves towards the reign of God in a certain soteriological 
dialectic. Here Moltmann refers to a soteriological patristic axiom: “God 
became human so that we human beings might become God” (Athanasius, 
Inc. 52). As far as I understand this contribution Moltmann is not saying 
anything about non living beings. 
A contribution of Elizabeth A. Johnson  (“Jesus and the Cosmos: 
Soundings in Deep Christology”) on ecological ethics follows.  
And Denis Edwards (“Incarnation and the Natural World: Explorations 
in the Tradition of Athanasius”) again addresses deification in the patristic 
tradition. His conclusion is, that, if God is engaged with every aspect of on-
going creation, it cannot be of a general kind but has to be seen as special 
divine action that engages with the particular in a kenotic way. Divine ac-
tion then involves the historical, the unpredictable and the specific – all liv-
ing (!) creatures and, in a unique interpersonal way, human beings. Again 
the providentia Dei is not seen for any non-living being. 
Celine Deane-Drummond (“The Wisdom of Fools? A Theo-Dramatic 
Interpretation of Deep Incarnation”) suggests that we construct a dialectical 
balance between Deep Incarnation, as predicated on Christology, and the 
idea of Divine Immanence, as on the belief in God as Creator. This would 
mean to take the Hebrew stress on history as seriously as the Hellenistic 
cosmological elements of Christian faith. Moreover Wisdom, Sophia, sug-
gests that we think through how to unite the particular with the universal – 
although there is a real temptation to move away from concrete uses of 
Wisdom to more speculative metaphysical interpretation (Deane-
Drummond gives Bulgakov as an example). Instead of explaining Deep In-
carnation as ontological extension of the enfleshment into all of creation, 
she suggests the method of theo-dramatic interpretation, i.e. to take a 
boundary position between historical and ontological accounts of Christol-
ogy (partly following Hans Urs von Balthasar here). 
Christopher Southgate (“Depth, Sign and Destiny: Thoughts on Incar-
nation”) introduces the church as a prolongation of the incarnation and from 
here develops an ethics for a time of serious ecological crisis. He sees 
Christ incarnate both as a sign of the being of God and as a sacrament of the 
salvation and ultimate destiny of creation – and the church as eschatological 
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community, the community of redeemed believers as the body of Christ in-
carnate and risen. “We [Robinson and Southgate] have suggested that Je-
sus’ life, taken as a whole, was – in terms of C. S. Peirce’s taxonomy of 
signs – an “iconic qualisign” of the being of God, a sign resembling the ob-
ject through its sheer quality rather than being related by some convention” 
(p. 211). Considering a wider Ecological Ethics, Southgate asks “What 
about those of other faiths?”, and argues that the deepening of Christian 
theology of the nonhuman world by means of a characteristically Christian 
trope of incarnation just draws us away from other religions. But, whoever 
manifests self-giving love even from no faith position has been touched by 
the life of God. This brings him to a definition of church as any community 
freed from narrow self interest.  
Niels Henrik Gregersen (“The Extended Body of Christ: Three Dimen-
sions of Deep Incarnation”) also refers to Athanasius (De Incarnatione 16): 
The Word (Logos) spread himself everywhere – Logos here in the sense of 
Wisdom and Word: God, by assuming the particular life story of Jesus also 
conjoined the material conditions of all flesh, shared and enabled the fate of 
all (!) biological life forms. He experienced the pain of sensitive creatures 
from within (sparrows and foxes). So deep incarnation presupposes a radi-
cal embodiment reaching into the roots of material and biological existence 
as into the darker sides of creation. If I am not mistaken Gregersen also ad-
dresses also non living beings when he develops the concept of Deep Incar-




For him the divine stretch between God Father and his eternal Son – 
mediated by the Spirit – is the presupposition for the divine reach into the 
depth of creation. And in questioning the chronocentric orientation over 
against nature, space and eternity he argues, that, although accepting time, 
we should move beyond a chronocentric worldview (Paul’s apocalyptic 
world view): “This theology of the cosmic body of Christ is not only about 
creation theology but about an ongoing reconciliation between Creator and 
creature” (p. 244). 
PART III - Divine Presence and Incarnation: Scientific and Philosoph-
ical Perspectives: 
Holmes Rolston III (“Divine Presence – Causal, Cybernetic, Caring, 
Cruciform: From Information to Incarnation”) confirms that it is indeed al-
ready a startling claim that God became flesh in the person of Jesus, but 
that it needs at least a person. He then asks what about animals? Although 
they show little evidence of having religious experiences, some ‘presence’ 
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seems to follow if the Spirit animates all life. If we enlarge “incarnate” with 
“embodied” it is easier to ask whether God might be embodied in animals. 
Further, if “soma” means “body” and refers to heavenly and human bodies, 
biologically plants have “soma” but not flesh. And even if we seldom think 
of plants as animated they are organic and God might be embodied in them. 
The question of God’s incarnation into non-living beings, into plants, is ad-
dressed very explicitly and very creatively from the point of view of philos-
ophy of nature. 
“Plants ‘respire’ and are upheld by divine power, but this is not yet in-
carnation” (p. 256). How about non-respiring matter? Pure mathematics is 
not even embodied, much less incarnate – not until it becomes applied 
mathematics, mixed into matter and energy (p. 259). And p. 260: “Within 
physical cosmology, the factual claims may be mathematical, based on val-
ues in equations, but the cosmological interpretation of these facts is not.” 
(It is historical, metaphysical, theological). Does it refer to immanence or 
incarnation? John sets Jesus in a cosmic framework, but did he also claim 
that Jesus transformed it? Since God became material did Jesus thereby in-
carnate all matter? 
p. 264f: Rolston continues by noting that Gregersen seeks a “strong 
continuity between the historical figure of Jesus and the cosmos at large.” 
That cannot mean that the life of Jesus affected distant galaxies, altering 
their nucleosynthesis. It might mean that the life of Jesus reveals at depth 
what the cosmological and evolutionary history, on certain of its trajecto-
ries, is tending toward: complex beings capable of suffering love. Perhaps 
all we need to claim is that Jesus revealed something about events preced-
ing him in natural history and gave humans some hope about events yet to 
come.” 
Genes have a telos, are ‘teleosemantic’. Evolutionary biologists thus 
deal with two more or less incommensurable domains: information and 
matter. The gene is a package of information ... there is more where once 
there was less. For scientists the superintending, supervening process is cy-
bernetic. For theologians, what is added to matter-energy is Logos. 
Evolutionary natural history has generated caring. A neural animal can 
love and experientally evaluate environment, sometimes even more com-
plex and sophisticated can learn and acquire behaviour. Then the Logos 
must in some sense have been ‘present’ in the genes of Jesus. And sharing 
his genes for example with chimpanzees etc – he had the signature of evo-
lutionary history. But this is not the point of John's prologue. For John the 
Logos has become flesh, entered sarx, i.e. all life on Earth (instead of all 
cosmic matter). 
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p. 279: “Persons have unique careers that interweave to form storied 
narratives in cultural heritages....to be a person includes a dimension of 
‘spirit’. Where there is reflective, sacrificial suffering love, there is spirit. 
There is spirit where there is a sensing of the numinous, the sacred, the ho-
ly. There is spirit where there is awe, a  sense of the sublime.” The question 
remains: might this imagination become incarnation? In the end the divine 
Logos only is incarnate when such sacrificial suffering love is deeply em-
bodied – and fully only in Jesus Christ life, death and resurrection. 
The cross of Christ can be said to fulfill that evolutionary cruciform 
world – although the cross of Christ does nothing to transform the evolu-
tionary process. And this maybe is also because in biology there simply is 
no sinfulness – nothing horribly broken about nature – perhaps natural his-
tory is already glorious enough. 
We however have staggering possibilities, able to think vastly more 
thoughts than there are atoms in the universe ... with escalating powers for 
good and evil. 
Stuart Kauffman (“Natural Incarnation: from the Possible to the Actu-
al”), one of the leaders and pioneers in the field of complexity theory at the 
Santa Fe Institute, New Mexico, introduces himself as a Jewish agnostic. 
As a biologist, he calls his paper speculative since in it, although himself a 
scientist, he is  “Reinventing the Sacred” –the title of one of his books: he is 
seeking a sense of God in the natural creativity of the living world. Like 
Gordon Kaufmann, with whom he has taught together at Harvard Divinity 
School, Kauffman views God as natural creativity; unlike Gordon Kauf-
mann however, not of the universe as a whole. 
Even beyond “Reinventing the Sacred” Kauffman sketches a possible 
natural interpretation – based on a new interpretation of quantum mechanics 
– of the Christian doctrine of the incarnation of a God who is outside of 
space and time in the physical world. He then, and even more speculatively, 
describes consciousness and its possible connection with quantum meas-
urements in our brains – perhaps in synaptic molecules. If evidence is found 
for it, then: a) quantum measurements are necessary but not sufficient for 
qualia to arise; b) they are both necessary and sufficient.` 
Kauffman goes for b) as being correct, although he cannot demonstrate 
it neither  and neither does he believe it! 
Hypothesis therefore is: wherever in the universe quantum measure-
ments occur, so do (proto)qualia. 
Of course the wave-particle duality does not obey Aristotle’s law of 
the excluded middle (which has been true for all classical physics). But 
again C.S. Peirce becomes helpful in the debate: actuals and probables obey 
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the law of excluded middle, possibles do not. As a result Kauffman con-
structs a new dualism: the world consists of ontologically real actuals and 
ontologically real possibles, truly linked, i.e. united by quantum measure-
ment.– and conscious experience is associated with it. Possibles becoming 
actual however are not to be measured in the known way. In analogy, natu-
ral incarnation would be such an event and not need the action of any theis-
tic God. 
Kauffman’s next question is whether the universe is observing itself. 
Mind as a quantum coherent or partially decoherent process can have con-
sequences for brain, but these consequences are not causal. If we then iden-
tify consciousness with quantum measurement it buries the mystery of what 
consciousness is in the further mystery of what measurement is. But if there 
is no mechanism for measurement (cf Conway and Kochen: “Strong Free 
Will Theorem”) at least we ‘know’ why consciousness remains a mystery. 
Argued from a neuroscience point of view, what is called ‘non-
locality’ in physics leads to the hypothesis that anatomically unconnected 
brain areas can be quantum entangled. Via measurement of the entangled 
quantum processes (and hence with associated qualia) derived from a single 
quantum system we can have a unity of consciousness. Then quantum 
measurement is both necessary and sufficient for qualia and a final ‘unity of 
qualia’ in the abiotic universe seems not impossible. 
Information theory as we know it does not apply to evolution of the bi-
osphere, hence to the becoming of the universe. But if we imagine that 
protoqualia in the universe are entangled we could conceivably get a unity 
of protoconsciousness. Freedom emerges with measurement – and so we 
could have a means to affect the actual world. This idea of an ‘I’ might 
even suggest the idea of a theistic God. 
Dirk Evers (“Incarnation and Faith in an Evolutionary Framework”) 
elaborates incarnation as God’s transformative presence in creation in terms 
of the doctrine of justification by faith alone. The latter implying a funda-
mental inter-relatedness of divine presence and human existence – and thus 
referring to a relational understanding of God and creation in an evolution-
ary framework. Evers suggests that God overcomes the spiritual distance 
between him and human beings through incarnation then. The cross can be 
seen as hermeneutical key to God’s transformative presence. 
Humans are humans (special?) because of this justification. They de-
velop and lead their lives as naturally social and cultural animals. And so 
the cognitive distance for human beings is partly overcome through incar-
nation (although God is present for the whole world). This broader concept 
of incarnation, even if taken as normative, does not imply any timely or re-
ligiously bound exclusivism. 
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Robert John Russell (“Jesus: the Way of all Flesh and the Proleptic 
Feather of Time”), the founder and director of The Center for Theology and 
the Natural Sciences in Berkeley, stresses the importance of physics and 
cosmology for a reformulation of Christian theology (besides evolutionary 
and molecular biology and others). Following Gregersen’s “Deep Incarna-
tion” into the very tissue of biological existence, the system of nature, Rus-
sell argues that: 
1. Since all biological organisms are physical entities we should think 
of the divine reach as even deeper than biology, namely into the underlying 
physics of our universe with its cosmic fine-tuning for life. And if the di-
vine reach extends into physics, the physics of the flesh of Jesus, the fine-
tuning making the evolution of flesh possible. Also since the physical pre-
conditions for life, created by God ex nihilo, include inevitable suffering 
(addressed as “natural evil” and in “natural theodicy”) they may also help to 
explain the soteriological dimensions of incarnation in a new light. 
2. However, there is faith in incarnation because of the faith in resur-
rection. In following thoughts of Moltmann, Pannenberg and Peters inter-
preting resurrection as a proleptic event in which the extraordinary eschato-
logical future is manifest in the midst of our ordinary future, Russell states 
that the former is neither radically continuous nor discontinuous. Instead it 
is a radical transformation of the futurum into the adventus. Again the linear 
character of time is at stake. Since the theological concept of prolepsis leads 
to a physical concept of time as multiply-connected. In the light of the chal-
lenge of natural theodicy Russell suggests finding this proleptic temporal 
structure in all moments of time, i.e. not only relevant for human beings. 
3. The evolutionary history of moral and immoral behaviour in non-
human and human animals is manifest in context-specific ways, but the 
physics of the universe has to be seen as an underlying and remote precon-
dition for its possibility. 
When talking about natural evil and natural goodness, sin at this level 
is no longer a helpful concept. 
In addition: eschatological future connects points as if proleptically to 
sequential present moments. They might be experienced as perpendicular to 
time as in mystic and apophatic tradition of the numinous presence of the 
risen Christ. But also parallel to time, i.e. kataphatic.  
If physics of this fine-tuned universe offers a precondition for the pos-
sibility of prolepsis this calls for an interaction of theology and science. So 
what is called “theology of nature”, for example by Barbour, is then to re-
formulate theology in the light of science. Theology can, by contrast, lead 
to interesting insights and suggestions about research programs in science 
as well. 
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The volume ends with an Afterword by the well-known mathematical 
physicist and theologian John Polkinghorne. Polkinghorne expresses reser-
vations about an approach to thinking about God’s relationship with crea-
tion that stresses the concept of incarnation to the extent expressed in the 
preceding chapters. Although there is a sincere theological need to express 
divine presence within the travail of creation in an act of redemptive soli-
darity between Creator and creatures, Polkinghorne warns us not to blur dif-
ferences in ontological status between God and humans (world). Because of 
God’s aseity there can be everlasting hope wholly independent of whatever 
may be the present state of the created universe. Finally, the deep connec-
tion between Creator and suffering creation is best pursued within a Trini-
tarian setting. 
And it ends with a reflection of Niels Henrik Gregersen on, once again, 
“Opportunities and Challenges” of the concept of “Deep Incarnation”. He 
suggests, along with many others, that we should distinguish but not sepa-
rate Incarnation from Creation, and likewise not the Work of Christ from 
His Being-There, and why we should not think about Resurrection in 
chronocentric terms. For Gregersen “[D]eep incarnation is thus a proposal 
for a Christology that responds to being a victim, not only to being a sin-
ner”(p.379). God comes to mind in coming to flesh. 
Reviewers facit: Although on the specific question of “Deep Incarna-
tion” this volume is a compendium for what is important in the ongoing 
dialogue between theology and natural science in general. It should be in 
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Book Reviews 
Celia Deane-Drummond, Sigurd Bergmann and Bronislaw Szerszynski 
(eds.) Technofutures, Nature and the Sacred: Transdisciplinary Perspec-
tives, Farnham, UK: Ashgate, xv + 289 pp. ISBN 978-1-4724-4410-3 
(hdbk), £65. 
This book gathers some of the papers presented at the fourth biennial 
conference of the European Forum for the Study of Religion and Environ-
ment (Sweden, May 2013). As the title already suggests and the introduc-
tion underlines, the distinctive feature of this work lies in trying to relate 
three thematic areas of huge interest at present: philosophy of technology in 
a broad sense, environmental studies and religious studies. While joint 
treatments of any two of them are common in the literature, efforts to inter-
twine all three of them are quite rare, although such an approach brings 
considerable gains both in analytical refinement and in critical potential. 
This transdisciplinary vocation extends also to cultural and social studies, 
since culture and social relations are aspects that necessarily modulate all 
three above-mentioned disciplines. Another outstanding feature is the inter-
religious or at least non-exclusively Christian character of this initiative. 
Being so ambitious and gathering such a wide range of authors (13), it is no 
wonder that the present volume shows a marked heterogeneity; in spite of 
that, it has more unity than one would expect and offers as a whole a useful 
summary of the state of play of the running discussions in this extraordinar-
ily important issue. 
An informative introduction (offering relevant summaries of all chap-
ters) gives way to three parts: Theories, Religious Narratives, Practices, 
each one containing four papers. A contemporary mythological narrative 
written by Bronislaw Szerczynski as an evocative synthesis rounds the 
book, which also includes a comprehensive bibliography, up. 
Part I establishes the theoretical framework for the discussion. Walther 
C. Zimmerli reflects on the historical evolution of technology (which 
should be understood as culture), as well as on the impact of technological 
innovations on our understanding of responsibility and on the challenges 
this poses to ethics. He considers it necessary to move from a principled 
ethics to an applied ethics and encourages the reader to develop a pragmatic 
model of applied procedural ethics of responsibility towards extra-human 
nature. Maria Antonaccio strives to give a new orientation to the discussion 
on technology and humanisation of nature, which she considers detrimen-
tally dominated by the issue of the independence of nature from human ac-
tion. She draws on M. J. Radin’s analysis of commodification as a social 
process in order to highlight the question of whether a specific technology 
respects or suppresses (either destroying or making inaccessible) certain 
30                         ESSSAT News & Reviews, 26-3 September 2016   
 
goods associated with human experience of nature which have become an 
integral part of our horizon of meaning. Humanisation through technology 
represents a threat not only for non-human nature, but for human flourish-
ing as well. Fionn Bennett tries to vindicate M. Heidegger’s hermeneutical 
philosophy of technology, exploring the way in which some extra-
technological aspects of Heideggerian thought inform his discourse on 
technology. He underlines Heidegger’s enigmatic, Hölderlin-like statement 
that technology is “supremely perilous” but, for the same reason, also a 
“source of salvation”. Finally, Peter Scott insists on how important is to un-
derstand technology as culture. His aim is to develop a theology of technol-
ogy. As a first step in this direction he analyses the difficulties that such an 
enterprise encounters in the three spheres that structure any theological an-
thropology: self-relatedness, wholeness and world-relatedness. This allows 
him to make some suggestions for a critical reconstruction of these theolog-
ical ideas, for which purpose he draws on a differentiated concept of God.    
In Part II several theological or religious motives gain prominence, alt-
hough narrative character is not paramount in all chapters. Nor is the differ-
ence in approach from the papers of Part I always clear enough. Lisa Sideris 
examines the way in which some of the most prominent scientists involved 
in the Manhattan Project used religious and mythological narratives about 
innocence, hubris, fall and wonder to describe, rationalise and legitimate a 
research that culminated in such a human and environmental catastrophe. 
Sideris pays special attention to the motive of wonder, which she evaluate 
from a moral point of view, and warns against a too-literal understanding of 
the statements of the scientists about their innocence and ignorance of the 
consequences of their work. Basing on ideas of Maximus the Confessor and 
some modern Orthodox theologians such as Ware and Zizioulas, Francis 
van der Noortgaete tries to outline an iconic-liturgical approach to human 
technology in nature. The notion of the “iconicity” of nature and a priestly 
anthropology lead him to propose that technology must be seen and imple-
mented not as deployment of an autonomous power over nature, but as a 
call to a non-hierarchic relation and collaboration between humans and non-
human nature by being creative in God’s likeness. Sigurd Bergmann criti-
cises the thesis of the value-neutrality of technological innovations and con-
tends that they must be conceived of as physical outcomes of complex so-
cial processes about the production and sharing of power between humans, 
but also between human and non-human life forms.  This allows him to car-
ry out an extension to technology of the Marxian concept of “fetish”. A his-
torical examination shows that it was precisely through fetishisation that 
Modernity incorporated classical animism, transforming it simultaneously. 
But since this process has led to a sort of life-denying idolatry, it must be 
resisted and overcome. A possible way to achieve this aim would be 
through a neoanimism which understands technology as a life-enhancing 
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gift instead of as a tool to have dominion over life. This would allow to 
connect with the Christian experience of the Holy Spirit, the Spirit of life 
and to develop an ecological pneumatology. Finally, Celia Deane-
Drummond ponders on the effects of technologisation of life, focusing on 
transhumanist projects to enhance human abilities and indefinitely extend 
human lifespan. Such projects not only presuppose a distorted, reductive 
view of human condition; they also foster a merely instrumental considera-
tion of animals, which ignores any limit to the transformation of their na-
ture, opening the door to a post-animal, even trans-animal society. The au-
thor sees in Hans Jonas’ metaphysical philosophy of life a possible correc-
tive to transhumanism. Completed with practical wisdom or prudential rea-
soning it could form the basis of a theological anthropology abreast of the 
times.  
Part III introduces different practices aiming to prevent the risks asso-
ciated with technology and set its huge positive potentialities free. David 
Gormley-O’Brien starts from the fact that the consumption of the average 
suburban home in the English-speaking world today is unsustainable both 
for economic and ecological reasons. He argues that there is a need to re-
cover certain aspects of homemaking prior to the industrial era and update 
them in the light of technological innovation. Rehabilitating homemaking 
both requires and lays the ethical and theological basis for a global cultural 
change. Forrest Clingermann and Matthew Kearnes, in two independent 
chapters, deal with the challenge of geoengineering, that is, the deliberate 
and large-scale modification of climatic systems in response to anthropo-
genic climatic change. Both papers are very critical of geoengineering. The 
first one adopts an obvious theological approach and considers that 
geoengineering lacks the humility to fulfil the aspiration to a material salva-
tion building on human ability to balance individual and social flourishing 
in the atmosphere. Its inability to listen to nature in meaningful ways makes 
it distort or invert the sacred. The second paper starts from a sociological 
perspective, but it arrives at theological conclusions too. Following Mil-
bank, the author questions any fundamental separation between the secular 
and the theological when trying to understand science and technology soci-
ologically. From here he moves forward to an archeological analysis of re-
ligious roots of economy, much along Agambes’ lines, which allows him to 
explore how geoengineering is situated in a biopolitical project that seeks to 
extend forms of economic valuation to the Earth as a whole. Finally, 
Zemfira Inogamova-Hanbury examines spiritual and economical practices 
among Kyrgyz, Kurdish, Turkish and Uzbeks farmers and how such prac-
tices contribute to their identity and resilience. 
This last part has great interest, even though the range of presented 
practices is necessarily limited. It is only natural that the stress lies on “eco-
logical” issues, but it might have been enriching to pay attention as well to 
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bioengineering, to the problem of energy production and consumption or 
even to artificial intelligence (in its medical applications, for example). 
Criticism is important, but not enough; positive, alternative practices are 
much needed. Papers presenting practices of this kind (homemaking, Cen-
tral Asian farmers) suffer perhaps from some romanticism. However, that is 
in essence the key question when facing these matters: how can we really 
bring it about that current technology, inserted in a thick net of economic, 
social and cultural interests, should be truly life-enhancing? In order to go 
beyond a mere desideratum, it is no doubt necessary to work out illuminat-
ing theoretical frames, motivating religious narratives and transformative 
practices. The book edited by Bergmann, Deane-Drummond y Szerszynski 
is a valuable contribution to this goal, a useful set of suggestions to keep 
moving forward along this track. 







Paul Cassell, Religion, Emergence, and the Origins of Meaning: Beyond 
Durkheim and Rappaport. Leiden: Brill, 2015, 203 pp., ISBN 978-90-04-
29365-6 (hdbk) $109.00 €84.00 
This book, as its author recounts in the preface, began as a “vague 
idea” (p. vii) of his about religion. It is the condensed version (after “hard 
work”, p. vii) of a doctoral dissertation. The basic idea of the book is that 
religion can be explained as an emergent phenomenon (in that respect, the 
book is entirely unoriginal). In the book – after a “primer” on emergence 
and semiotics, based largely on work from Terrence Deacon – two canoni-
cal authors in religious studies, sociologist Émile Durkheim (1858–1919) 
and anthropologist Roy Rappaport (1926–1997), are reinterpreted in the 
light of recent emergence theories. Before I assess what the reader in the 
end gains from this critical exegesis and update, let me outline the over-
arching approach towards religion. 
The aim of emergence theories of religion is to “provide natural expla-
nations for what has traditionally begged for supernatural explanation” (p. 
3). Religions can be seen as an example of “systems whose organizational 
dynamics use signs to maintain themselves and navigate their environment, 
without the need for divine help” (p. 3). The divine, instead, represents an 
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emergent quality of these systems. Authors such as Durkheim and Rappa-
port have already offered emergence theories of religion, but Cassell sees 
value in updating their accounts based on the latest writings on emergence 
theories (mostly focused on biology). 
According to Cassell, good theories of religion must explain “why the 
experiences resulting from religious participation can be such a powerful 
source of personal transformation” (p. 10) and why they give the impres-
sion of transcendence. Ritual and myth must play central roles in such theo-
ries. Durkheim and Rappaport do not yet offer good theories of religion. 
Cassell points out that Durkheim “is not able to theoretically distinguish 
politics from religion” (p. 12) and that Rappaport “does not adequately ex-
plain how ritual and myth... create meaningful religious experience” (p. 12). 
After his introductory chapter, six chapters follow, distributed over two 
parts (on the emergent dynamics of religion and the emergence of meaning 
in religion, respectively). Chapter 2 introduces and revisits Rappaport, 
Chapter 3 gives the primer into emergence and semiotics, and Chapter 4 de-
scribes religion’s emergent characteristics. The latter two chapters are quite 
difficult to plough through for a reader not well steaped in the theories that 
Cassell describes. They describe religion as an emergent social phenome-
non, “where mythic beliefs about the divine (a form of culturally-passed 
down memory) are taken up in ritual (a cultural practice) to link synergisti-
cally the psychological experiences of individuals and the dynamics of 
group organization” (p. 107). 
Part 2, “focus[ing] more on the question of religion’s meaningfulness, 
following Durkheim’s approach” (p. 107), is more accessible and starts in 
Chapter 5 with an interesting rendering of the arguments of evolutionary 
biologist David Sloan Wilson and philosopher Daniel Dennett that religion 
has no meaning. Cassell claims that both authors have ignored any emer-
gent experiences, values, or meaning associated with religion. In Chapter 6, 
he then adds Durkheim’s “account of the emergent qualities of religious 
community participation” to the mix, in order to be able to conclude in 
Chapter 7 with “a fuller account of these emergent qualities” (p. 107). 
The last chapter of the book, titled “Varieties of Religious Meaning”, 
is the most interesting one, even though it is not clearly structured. The 
general gist of his illustrations of the way in which religions have meaning 
is that from positing the divine as true in religious ritual something valuable 
is leveraged to individuals. Here Cassell discusses how religion can offer 
therapeutic truth (healing physically and psychologically; resolving unre-
solvables via hope; creating better selves; evoking novel blends of emo-
tions) and social orientation. 
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I doubt, however, that the reader in the end has gained much insight 
from Cassell’s exercise. Philosophically, the book is not very systematic 
and the author tries to compare and combine too many theories with too 
many other theories. That being said, there are a couple of really deep in-
sights contained in the book and readers who are well-versed in Terrence 
Deacon’s works may find it of use. 
Arthur C. Petersen 




Donovan O. Schaefer. Religious Affects: Animality, Evolution, and Power. 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015, 286 pp. ISBN 978-0-8223-
5990-6 (pbk). $18.61 (Amazon, USA). 
From Donovan O. Schaefer's personal web page we learn that he has a 
B.A. from the interdisciplinary Religion, Literature and the Arts program at 
the University of British Columbia,    masters and doctoral degrees in Reli-
gion from Syracuse University, and then he did a post-doc at Haverford col-
lege as a Mellon Fellow during which time he founded the Religion, Affect 
and Emotion Group at the American Academy of Religion. Since 2014, he's 
been at Oxford University as a lecturer and tutor in the Ian Ramsey Center 
for Science and Religion.  
In his first book, Religious Affects: Animality, Evolution and Power, 
Schaefer attempts to show how religion is something other than a linguistic 
construct or a set of beliefs about what is or isn't true. Instead, he proposes 
that we need to think of religion in "its animality," as being determined by 
embodied emotions rather than words. That's all very good. It is obvious 
that religion is composed of religious beliefs, emotions and behaviours. 
Schaefer could have approached the emotional aspects of religion from 
a variety of scientific, methodological naturalism perspectives. In my own 
simple world, if religious behaviour, religious beliefs and religious emo-
tions are at three corners of a triangle, change any one corner and that will 
have an influence on the other two corners. With an emphasis on the emo-
tional, that's his book in one simple sentence. The three items at the three 
corners of the triangle - religious behaviours, beliefs and emotions - are 
fundamentally biological entities that could be explored within the rich field 
of the bio-behavioural sciences. That's how I would have written the book. 
Schaefer, by contrast, writes like a literary social scientist who is almost 
oblivious to the rich biological literature on what he writes.  
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Rather than approaching religious affects (or religious emotions) scien-
tifically, Schaefer took a literary approach. He went with something called 
"affect theory," which he describes on his home page as an approach to cul-
ture, history and politics that focuses on non-linguistic forces, or affects. It 
is primarily used today in art critique, which in the opinion of this reviewer, 
is where it should stay. He goes on to say that "Affects make us what we 
are, but they are neither under our 'conscious' control nor even necessarily 
within our awareness - and they can only sometimes be captured in lan-
guage."  
He claims that his new book, Religious Affects, offers an introduction 
to affect theory that's accessible to a range of backgrounds and shows how 
it can be linked to other conversations happening in the humanities - includ-
ing Michael Foucault's 'analytics of power’. He goes on to say that affect 
theory helps us to understand power by encouraging us to think of power as 
theater. Really? Power as theater? Are there not real power relationships 
outside of theater, including those that occur within religious institutions? 
One does not model reality with theater. 
Affect theory is a little known literary cult or pop psychology. It de-
rives from the writings of the late psychologist Silvan Tomkins, who even 
has an Institute named after him today with a web page containing upcom-
ing talks and information about his rational therapeutic methods, now more 
in favor with non-scientific psychoanalysists and therapists than with evi-
dence-based practitioners. Tomkins opus magus is a four volume work, 
originally published in 1963 and now republished by Springer as Affect, 
Imagery, Consciousness: The Complete Edition, Volumes I - IV (2008, pp. 
1352). 
Although Schaefer says his new book should be "accessible to a range 
of backgrounds," my own background in zoology, evolutionary behavioural 
biology, medicine and psychiatry did not find the book accessible at all. It 
was actually painful, almost agonizing for me to read. Much of it was writ-
ten from a post-modernism literary perspective that I have trouble digest-
ing. The book is embellished with quotes from arcane literary works and 
sources about which I was neither interested nor knowledgeable. It is not a 
book on the science and theology interface or even on the science and reli-
gion interface. Rather, it is a book that looks at religion from a not well ac-
cepted, unscientific pop-psychology cult theory that finds a home more in 
rational therapeutic based, non-scientific psychoanalysis and counseling 
than in the scientific study of religion.  
The book contains an Introduction and 7 chapters that have names with 
almost no systematic relationship to one another, such as Intransigence, 
Teaching Religion, Emotion and Global Cinema, Compulsion, Savages, etc. 
The last chapter, A Theory of the Waterfall Dance, is the author's anecdotal 
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evidence that chimpanzees have a primitive type of awe-based affect reli-
gion to things like waterfalls. There are 40 pages of end notes, 17 pages of 
Bibliography, and 6 woefully inadequate pages of Index.  
The book appears to be a part of a thematic series by Duke University 
Press. The first in the series was The Affect Theory Reader edited by Melis-
sa Gregg and J. Seigworth (2010). That book probably explains why the 
current book was published. It is an application of the first book to religion.  
In the 3 pages of Acknowledgements in the beginning of the book the 
author thanked 146 people by name. The list of names looked more like the 
credits scrolling down the screen in a movie than what one is used to seeing 
in academic acknowledgements in scholarly books. That long list of movie-
like credits was a clue for me that I was not going to like this book. It is not 
a book I can recommend to anyone. But that's just my opinion. There are 
two positive endorsements on the book's back cover. On Donovan O. 
Schaefer's personal web site, there are positive, few-word excerpts from 
The Atlantic, The Times Literary Supplement, Journal of the American 
Academy of Religion, Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory, and Reli-
gious Studies Review. So by mentioning these favorable snippets, I believe I 
am balancing my rather negative view of the book with other reviews that 
appear to be more favorable. 




Radek Kundt, Contemporary Evolutionary Theories of Culture and the 
Study of Religion, London, Oxford UK, New York: Bloomsbury 2015, pp. 
179; ISBN: 9 78-1-4742-3224-1 
The author is assistant professor for the Study of Religions at Masaryk 
University in Brno (Czech Republic). He aims at a critical assessment of 
the different ways of using evolutionary theory for explaining religious 
phenomena. Kundt distinguishes between a loose Darwinian meta-
framework or Generalized Darwinism on the one hand, “applicable to all 
sorts of phenomena besides biology”, which uses no more than a basic idea 
of adaptation and competition to explain whatever there is to explain, and, 
on the other hand, theories which claim to apply the causal interactions of 
biological evolution to cultural developments. Generalized Darwinism, he 
proposes, is sometimes even extended to a Darwinian Monism or Universal 
Darwinism, which has little to do with science. It offers endless “possibili-
ties for pointlessly redescribing ordinary cause-and-effect sequences using 
the verbiage of natural selection.” (cited from S. Pinker, 2012, on p.7). The 
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biological theory of selection however  (called neo-Darwinian by the au-
thor) explains specific processes using the concepts of random phenotypic 
variation, fitness, heritability etc. Kundt’s thesis is that theories of cultural 
evolution which do not comply with this framework gain nothing by using 
biological terms. 
The book consists of a substantial introduction, and three main parts. 
The first part (ch. 1 and 2) describes the role of Darwinism in the history of 
Religious Studies, and the resulting “Classical Cultural Evolutionism”. The 
author identifies five typical errors found in its various manifestations, 
namely (a) linking any evolutionary process with progress, (b) connecting 
evolutionary processes with the concept of teleology, (c) overuse of unveri-
fiable statements, meaning what Stephen Jay Gould once called 
“adaptationist storytelling”, (d) linking the evolutionary process with the 
concept of rigid unilinearity, or a fixed pattern of development, (e) linking 
sociocultural evolutionary processes with the development of individual 
personality.  
The second part (ch. 3 to 5) endeavors to match evolutionary theories 
of religion against “neo-Darwinian theory”. Kundt describes, and criticises, 
three types of contemporary cultural evolutionism and their application to 
religion, which evade the traditional errors mentioned above: group selec-
tion accounts, dual inheritance accounts, memetic accounts. Group selec-
tion accounts propose that competition, and selection, of cultural traits op-
erate at a group level; e.g. that  religion developed because of its beneficial 
effects for the community. As a mayor proponent, the author cites the biol-
ogist D.S. Wilson among many others. (This review cannot do justice to the 
numerous citations, and remarks, which in this, and the following chapters, 
relate to many sources.) Dual inheritance accounts stress the feedback ef-
fects of culture onto the gene pool of a given social unit, and put forward 
instances of gene-culture coevolution. Mayor proponents are P.J. Richerson 
and R. Boyd. A genetic basis for a religious disposition, by such an ac-
count, could have evolved because non-compliance to moral norms af-
firmed by a proto-religion, would have led to social disgrace and lowered 
the chance of reproduction. Memetic accounts propose that specific instruc-
tions to generate technological, social or behavioural products can be re-
garded as a second set of replicators beside genes. They influence the fit-
ness of their bearers, and therefore undergo evolution according to the prin-
ciples of selection theory. Such memetic accounts date back to R. Dawkin's 
“Selfish Gene”, and have been expounded by S. Blackmore et al.  
The third part of the book (ch. 6 and 7) presents the author's rejection 
of all theories which propose an autonomous, or genuine, process of cultur-
al evolution. The alternative is an “Evolutionary Study of Culture Without 
Cultural Evolution” (EWCE). It proposes that the architecture of the human 
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mind predetermines the characteristics, and the success, of cultural varia-
tions including religious systems. Culture, and religion, are thus explained 
as products of “evolutionarily evolved minds” (p.119), that is by evolution-
ary psychology. Religion might nonetheless be adaptive, or it might be a 
mere by-product of cognitive evolution, or some combination of both. In 
any case, to the author it is futile to search for religion-specific evolutionary 
dynamics. He bases his opinion, among others, on the work of A. 
Norenzayan and S. Pinker. 
As a reviewer with a biological background I found reading the book 
sometimes taxing. In my opinion, the author's “neo-Darwinian theory” does 
not depict the current state of evolutionary biology in full. Moreover, it is 
often presented in too simple terms. On page 88 (during a discussion of 
Meme theory) it is stated that “the impact of the gene can be neutral (if the 
interest of memes is different from the interest of genes), but it can also be 
useful (if the interest of memes is in agreement with the interest of genes) 
or harmful (if the interest of memes is opposite to the interest of genes).” 
Such a description of genetic-cultural coevolution recalls the verbal man-
nerisms of R. Dawkins from the seventies. On p. 44 (during the discussion 
of altruism in group selection) one finds the following passage: “Standard 
individual-gene selection predicts that individuals will behave altruistically 
only if this altruism ultimately leads to an advantage for their gene (either 
in themselves or in their relatives). They (individuals) will be re-
strained/reluctant towards its extreme self-sacrificing form.” I myself would 
put it like that: Standard Selection theory predicts that the genetic basis of 
altruistic behaviour remains or spreads in the gene pool because its 
phenotypical expression results in a fitness advantage relative to genetic 
traits which express as less altruistic behaviour. When the author sets out 
(parts 1 and 2) to examine if any current theory of religion complies with 
such a concept of individual-gene selection, one knows the result before-
hand: No one stands up to scrutiny. It cannot be otherwise, because cultural 
variations, between individuals, families or groups, are all goal-orientated, 
not “random”, although unintended side effects may, and often do, occur. 
Their heritability is of a Lamarckian, not Darwinian, type at best, and the 
proposed replicators (cultural group traits, memes etc.) patently have other 
characteristics than genetic information. Moreover, the concept of biologi-
cal fitness cannot be transferred to cultural developments. If people prefer 
cultural trait B to A, for whatever reason, the population will switch to B. 
But no fitness ratio can be ascribed to A and B; B's spread has to be ex-
plained in different terms. To me, this valid critique does not make EWCE 
a satisfying solution. That the genetic prerequisites of culture evolved by 
the natural processes of biological evolution, and culture (including reli-
gion) developed differently, is probably true. But I remain unconvinced that 
the interaction between them can be reduced to effects of the evolution of 
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cognitive abilities. And I remain thoroughly unconvinced that this interac-
tion is sufficiently described by the author's statement that “the innate psy-
chological mechanisms of our current stone-age minds... shaped our reli-
gious beliefs and behaviour in the past, as they do so even today.” (p.119). 
There might be more to the human mind than that. 
The strength of the book is the critical analysis of the many, often 
fragmentary, theories in its field. It is a programmatic work, and offers nei-
ther empirical research nor novel explanations of any religious (or other) 





Tim Lewens, Cultural Evolution: Conceptual Challenges, Oxford, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 205, ISBN: 978-0-19-967418-3; € 
49,00 (Hdbk.). 
Questions about how to relate nature and culture have challenged many 
specialists for a long time, and for many it has become an intractable issue. 
The feeling often is that such interaction has been explained according to 
dominant intellectual and academic fashions. Two big movements have 
clashed in fierce combat, each trying to provide certainty and understand-
ing: on the one hand biological reductionism, as for instance in the versions 
of sociobiology – first – and evolutionary psychology – later; on the other 
hand, social constructivism. However some signs revealing a more open 
mood perhaps can point towards some type of integration. Indeed “gene-
culture co-evolution” has become a quite common and broadly accepted 
model to explain how both dimensions are linked. In any case, it is too early 
to declare peace between very contentious factions. Some attempts to deal 
with culture reveal once more reductivist strategies and maneuvering to 
render and interpret cultural phenomena in biological terms as a result of 
selective or adaptive evolution. 
Lewens’ new book could not be more timely. His work is a badly 
needed contribution to help tackle that thorny issue, and to introduce con-
structive nuances that could better explain the complexities involved in cul-
tural dynamics. This is a very central point in several interdisciplinary set-
tings, one of which is the new scientific study of religion. Furthermore, the-
ology being primarily a cultural activity, then the study of culture carries 
great relevance. 
Cultural Evolution is a critical essay that reviews in depth the available 
positions, displaying wide erudition on the stated subject and related topics. 
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The author’s aim is to assess the main proposed versions of how culture can 
be understood in evolutionary ways. Nine chapters expound the book's con-
tent in orderly and summarized mode. The present review will try to intro-
duce the main points, especially considering their relevance for the science-
and-theology dialogue.  
The first chapter is devoted to a description of three main theories deal-
ing with culture in evolutionary terms: the historical approach; cultural 
selectionism, sometimes resorting to replicators – memes – and describing 
selection as a competition; and the kinetic theory, stressing the centrality of 
learning between individuals. ‘Cultural epidemiology’, which looks at the 
‘contagion of ideas’, can be included in the last model. This taxonomy 
helps in distinguishing among proposals and also helps to avoid too early 
dismissals. The author then turns to the most promising model, the kinetic 
theory of culture.  
The kinetic theory is broader than the selectionist one, and following 
its main proponents, Boyd and Richerson, cultural phenomena move be-
yond ‘aggregated products of individual interactions’ to assume an informa-
tional view that can be mathematically modeled (25). The first steps point 
to a rebuttal of alternative theories, like the one based on memes and their 
contagion, creating ‘viruses of mind’ and thereby rendering humans passive 
hosts. Selectionist models, then, entail competition, and this is not always 
the case among cultural units. Other objections against evolutionary theo-
ries of culture require assessment, but often problems arise because of mis-
understandings regarding human nature, and a ‘progress’ representation of 
historical change with ambiguous consequences. The population models 
rather resort to ‘conformist bias’ and learning processes in human interac-
tion. A pragmatic interest in pushing social sciences towards more scientific 
and reliable progress appears to be motivating some who are proposing that 
model.  
Chapter 3 is devoted to an analysis of culture as information. Such a 
task presents difficult challenges. After reviewing several proposals, 
Lewens defends a ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ approach, after confronting the 
many weaknesses. Indeed that concept appears as too broad, and can be 
viewed, following Mesoudi, as ‘knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, norms, pref-
erences and skills’ (49). In any case, the proposed analysis reveals that in-
formation can be transmitted by different means as it does in the one based 
on selection; it requires an interaction with ‘socially structured environ-
ments’; and can resort to external storing means. 
Chapters 4 and 5 can be considered digressions on ‘human nature’, 
whose relevance is apparent in an essay about cultural evolution, since that 
nature has many times been viewed in contrast with culture. The idea is 
pervasive in biological and human sciences, looking for constant and uni-
ESSSAT News & Reviews, 26-3 September 2016                         41 
 
versal traits. However, many scholars in the evolutionary camp refuse such 
an approach. The deep analysis in these pages from many authors clearly 
invites one to reject too strong a distinction between the natural and the cul-
tural, when humans are involved. Imitation and learning emerge as plausi-
ble proposals, however only a ‘libertine’, i.e. very broad and fuzzy descrip-
tion of similarities, could satisfy that search. The same applies to descrip-
tions of gene-culture co-evolution, again moving beyond strong distinc-
tions. Interestingly the criticism extends to Pascal Boyer and his well 
known cognitive analysis of religion. The proposed integration is apparent 
in proposals like ‘Developmental systems theory’, describing how diverse 
processes result in bringing out many traits. Even the concept of ‘innate-
ness’ becomes problematic from that perspective, as well as the distinction 
between individual and social learning.  
Chapter 6 examines ‘cultural models’ and how cultural evolution can 
be modeled. This approach means models describing ‘how beliefs and val-
ues are transmitted among individuals, and how this process generates and 
maintains differences among groups’ (106). The analysis shows a circulari-
ty that affects its robustness. Even ‘conformity models’ appear as circular 
and too simplified. This skepticism gives place to the next chapter and its 
analysis of ‘populations, people, and power’. Indeed power dynamics could 
reveal how individuals aggregate in populations. However tensions arise 
again between the macro- and the micro-level and about the heuristic power 
that evolutionary theories can exhibit. Possibly, ‘networks analysis’ can 
provide some healthy correctives. 
‘Cultural adaptationism’ is the title of the last thematic chapter. In this 
case, early environments in which humans evolved carry maximal im-
portance to explain the direction assumed by cognitive and cultural evolu-
tion. Once more skepticism arises over such explanations, which often sim-
plify that context and become too speculative. In the end, they appear to 
lack explanatory force. To give a more promising result such approach 
should integrate more contributions from other disciplines. Adaptive pro-
cesses become more complex and are the result of many interactions. All 
this justifies a need to assume a more ‘eclectic synthesis’, one that includes 
developmental and historical views. Only when the biological and social 
sciences are integrated will there be a promising path to better understand 
how culture evolves, beyond sheer adaptive strategies. 
The last chapter deals with the proposed eclectic program by means of 
a case study: emotions. The discussion in these pages clearly claims that it 
overcomes a too-restricted approach under the promise of more scientific 
results. The reductive program appears as faulty, since culture in many cas-
es influence how emotions are expressed and understood; an essentialist 
view would lack that necessary perspective. The conclusion reveals what 
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can be learned from this set of theories. Beyond selectionist and adaptive 
theories, phylogenetic models can, at least to some extent, help us to better 
grasp constraints affecting historical processes, but they cannot provide 
complete explanations.  
This book is not easy reading. Many distinctions and nuances need to 
be followed in detail to learn about opportunities and limits of current theo-
ries on cultural evolution. There are few original contributions, most of the 
book being concerned with testing and evaluating other authors’ models. 
However, it is an important book that helps to clarify a very sensitive field 
affecting in many ways social and human sciences. Indeed the recorded 
conclusions are very instructive and invite some applications. The first one 
is general and concerns how cultural activities cannot be reduced to sheer 
biological ones, even if biological knowledge and factors are important and 
a component that should not be ignored. This means that a good knowledge 
of human cultural phenomena requires a true interdisciplinary engagement, 
the recommended ‘eclectic approach’. 
The second application is more concrete and concerns the new scien-
tific study of religion, especially what is called ‘Cognitive Science of Reli-
gion’. Those who are familiar with its developments can recognize how 
many of the basic tenets have been targets of strong criticism by Lewens’ 
review. If he is right, then a large part of that cognitive endeavor needs deep 
revision, since the program did rely – and still does – on biological explana-
tions of religion as a cultural entity. Even recent attempts to account for the 
cultural and historical dimension try to explain it in very reductive ways, 
neglecting many factors involved in religious evolution. In that sense, 
Lewen’s book should be read together with Radek Kundt’s Contemporary 
Evolutionary Theories of Culture and the Study of Religion, reviewed 
above. The latter was published a few months later and covers similar 
ground, but is more focused on the study of religion, and arrives at analo-
gous conclusions about it. 
It is expected that this book might contribute to a better balance in the 
relationship between sciences and humanities, something urgently needed 
after many unfortunate excesses. That balance will be the result of more – 
not less – rational understanding, or deeper knowledge in our research and 
dialogue between science and theology 
 
Lluis Oviedo 
Antonianum University, Rome 
 
*** 
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Suzan Mazur. The Paradigm Shifters: Overthrowing ‘The Hegemony of 
the Culture of Darwin’. New York: Caswell Books, 2015, 220 pp;  ISBN 
978-0-692-52613-2 (pbk) $18.00. 
What are the sources of variation in the natural world? Darwin could 
not know, and did not claim to. But it is the subject of this book, whose 
subtitle I find objectionable, yet whose content has much that is interesting. 
It consists of a series of interviews with a diverse selection of experi-
mentalists working on sources of variation, and some theoreticians thinking 
freshly about the subject. The interviewer, Suzan Mazur is an American 
science journalist who (assuming the back-cover photograph is recent) is 
quite young and who certainly has a youthful taste for sensationalism. She 
seems to want her interviewees to characterize the majority of their peers as 
a sclerotic scientific/political establishment, their minds closed to new find-
ings and the consequent new ideas. There may be some limited justification 
for this view, but the tone of the book is seriously one-sided – there are no 
interviews with members of that presumed establishment. Indeed, only two 
are directly named: Jerry Coyne (Chicago) who vigorously defends tradi-
tional views, is implied here to be a purblind obscurantist, whose “behavior 
in defense of Darwinian scenarios” Mazur presumes to call “obnoxious”. 
The other named exponent of traditional thinking is one Richards Dawkins. 
They both happen to regard evolutionary theory as refuting religious ideas, 
but it is their scientific stance, not their theological position, that is the issue here. 
So, if we attempt to look beyond the sensationalism, the distortions, 
and the inexcusable bias, what is the substance of the book? If there is a 
valid stalking-horse it is much less Darwin than Neo-Darwinism – the 
“Modern Synthesis” of Darwin’s ideas with those of Mendel, and a group 
of population geneticists centred around R.A. Fisher in the early 1930s. 
Given genetic variation, caused by random mixing in sexual reproduction 
and occasional mutations of the genes themselves, natural selection would 
result in the gradual emergence of forms sufficiently new and separate from 
their forbears to be identified as new species. Natural selection was emphat-
ically Darwin’s idea, but only a few of this book’s contributors take issue 
with it – and when they do their criticism is neither consistent nor clear. 
This is inevitable because (as I’ve put it before in these pages) natural se-
lection cannot not occur! Darwin did also believe that the accumulated ef-
fect of variations which were individually small could account for the 
whole of current biological diversity, and it has become increasingly evi-
dent that not all the variations which have in fact occurred were small. 
Much of the positive material in this book consists of evidence about 
sources of much larger variations. But, before rejecting Darwin’s notion as 
a “hegemony”, it would be judicious to consider what Darwin himself was 
contradicting. It was the concept that only separate, Divine creative acts 
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could explain the variety of living forms. No contributor to this book would 
fail to side wholeheartedly with Darwin there, but Suzan Mazur never 
thinks to draw this out. For her, consensus makes bad copy. 
Perhaps the first valid criticism of Neo-Darwinism is that it concentrat-
ed on the properties and distribution of genes, transmitted from precursor to 
subsequent generations. This stance had nothing to do with Darwin, who 
had no concept of the gene; by contrast it could quite properly be said to 
have begun with Mendel, writing only seven years after The Origin of Spe-
cies first appeared. It reached its highest point in the mid-century work of 
Crick & Watson, and the “central dogma” of molecular biology, namely 
that all information flow was from the DNA gene, via RNA to the protein 
constructed from that template. When this dogma was expounded by Crick, 
contrary evidence was already being reported by C.H. Waddington, whose 
word “epigenetics” recognized the modification of rigid, one-effect only 
genetic mechanisms by the history of the progenitors – exposure to starva-
tion, temperature extremes, etc – and the circumstances of the progeny’s 
development. By about 1980, the fact that only perhaps 5% of animal genes 
worked in the simple, Mendel-Crick way, had led some to describe the rest 
of the DNA as “junk”. But it wasn’t junk: in large measure it was the route 
by which the performance of the Mendel-Crick genes was epigenetically 
modified.  
Another criticism of the Neo-Darwinists, arguably even more major, is 
that they thought almost entirely in terms of multi-cellular organisms and 
sexual reproduction. It would be in a sense justified, but ridiculous, to im-
plicate Darwin in this, because he simply did not know of bacteria, let alone 
viruses and yet more primitive agents, and had very limited knowledge 
even of the larger single-celled organisms. Yet the Modern Synthesists 
could have spread their nets more widely, had they been so inclined: it was 
surely a limitation of interest rather than knowledge which led them to fo-
cus on relatively advanced species? 
What were thus overlooked, for at least two generations onward from 
the 1930s, were a fascinating range of mechanisms and processes, studies 
of which provide almost all the experimental substance of the present book. 
While we may still think in terms of genes, as a Mendel or a Crick might 
have recognized them, it is now beyond dispute that bacteria and other uni-
cellular organisms can transfer these not only “vertically” to their progeny, 
in cell division, but “horizontally”, between contemporaries. The trans-
ferred DNA now functions in the recipient organism along with the genetic 
material which was there before: a massive species-change has occurred. 
And if we look beyond the genes as such, those viruses which carry DNA, 
and often largely consist of it, clearly bring about substantial changes when 
they invade a host cell’s genome. (Viruses containing only RNA may cir-
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cumvent that route.) In a complex animal or plant such an invaded (“infect-
ed”) cell is usually regarded simply as malfunctioning, but a free-living sin-
gle cell may survive, or even flourish, with its properties significantly 
changed. Clearly, such mechanisms must be taken into account in an over-
all view of species change – and hence of evolution. And it is coming to 
seem probable, not just possible, that in the past if perhaps not currently 
such effects occurred at least occasionally in multi-cellular organisms too. 
So yes, the “Modern” (1930s) Synthesis needs very considerable extension.  
But this is universally recognized. I know no currently-practising ge-
neticist or developmental biologist who is not very aware of such expan-
sions of their fields. Where they healthily and rightly differ is over how fast 
and how uncritically to modify their thinking. There is great value in ex-
ploring to the fullest extent possible the ability of an established model to 
explain new findings. That at least some practitioners should hasten slowly, 
in this way, is an essential process, if the science concerned is not to be un-
fruitfully destabilized. That is why it was so very wrong of Mazur not to 
interview some of those who question how radical the changes in thinking 
need to be. She simply has no sense of the proper process of science, the 
essentiality of there being two sides in a debate. 
Those she does talk to start with Chicago microbiologist James 
Shapiro, whose book Evolution: A View from the 21st Century is seminal. 
He lays the groundowrk thus: “The conventional view is that the genome is 
a read-only memory (ROM) system that changes only by copying errors. … 
The contemporary idea is that the genome is a read-write (RW) storage sys-
tem that changes by direct cell activity. How cell-control circuits guide that 
change [in] activity is the scientific issue of the moment”. Equally eminent 
was the late Carl Woese; interviewed very near the end of his life, he pays 
tribute to Shapiro as his successor, while making many points of his own 
about the very earliest stages of life on earth – it was he who first recog-
nised the archaea, as a form distinct from both bacteria and eukaryotes, as 
well as the process of horizontal gene transfer noted above.  
I can mention only three more of the 19 people interviewed by Mazur. 
One is the Israeli evolutionist Eibi Nevo: 
“[E]volution theory … evolves with our better understanding of the 
world. Clearly the genomic era contributed dramatically …. [Yet] 
now it is clear that the remarkable developments in regulation by 
non-coding [‘junk’] DNA and epigenetics have contributed dramati-
cally … regarding nonrandom  … or adaptive mutations, the genome 
as a read-write memory system, and … what James Shapiro calls 
natural genetic engineering.”  
Those comments concern what DNA does. In counterpoint, to represent 
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modern thinking about where it comes from, let me quote New York cell 
biologist, Stuart Newman: 
“You can’t look at a straight line of descent anymore because viruses 
and other entities are coming in at all stages of evolution. … You re-
ally can’t track linearly from primitive form through changes in the 
genome to later forms because entities are now understood to be 
coming in laterally from other forms.”. 
The scientists speak with balance, generosity and perspective – all proper-
ties strikingly lacking in what Mazur writes herself. A further case in point, 
with the widest sweep of all, is this comment from the British-born physi-
cist, and collaborator of Woese’s, Nigel Goldenfield. 
“Life is inherently self-referential .. like a computer program that can 
overwrite .. itself as it runs. The notion that the program is the data 
and the data is the program, the idea that .. the rules that govern life 
are themselves changed by the rules – that’s self-referentiality. It 
gives you a description of the physical system that behaves in a 
mathematical way .. quite unlike any other system we’ve ever stud-
ied.” 
ESSSAT readers will sense that there’s challenging theological materi-
al here, but Mazur is not the interviewer to draw it out. In fact, there is just 
one direct comment on theology, but it’s a good one, and it’s satisfyingly 
made by Carl Woese himself: “I do not like people saying that atheism is 
based on science, because it’s not. It’s an alien invasion of science”. 
Neil Spurway 
University of Glasgow 
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New books relevant for Science-and-Theology 
All the titles in this section are available for review; interested colleagues 
please contact the Editor to request one or more books. 
General issues 
 
Niels Gregersen and Mikael Stenmark, eds., 
Naturalism and Beyond: Religious Naturalism and Its Alternatives 
Leuven: Peeters, 2016 
This book offers a critical analysis of the varieties of contemporary natural-
ism - from scientific naturalism to religious naturalism. What are the claims 
of naturalism apart from its denial of 'the supernatural'? What are the dis-
tinctive modes of thought within contemporary religious naturalism? Some 
argue for a science-based worldview, others for a cosmic view of reality 
that includes human engagement and religious commitment - with or with-
out God-talk. The book shows how an appeal to what is beyond empirically 
validated facts resurfaces within most varieties of naturalism 
 
Robert Audi  
Naturalism, Normativity and Explanation 
Copernicus Center Press, 2016 
This book critically examines philosophical naturalism, evaluates the pro-
spects for naturalizing such normative properties as being a reason, and 
proposes a theory of action-explanation. This theory accommodates an ex-
planatory role for both psychological properties such as intention and nor-
mative properties such as having an obligation or being intrinsically good. 
This overall project requires distinguishing philosophical from methodolog-
ical naturalism, arguing for the possibility of a scientifically informed epis-
temology that is not committed to the former. 
 
Marcus du Sautoy   
What We Cannot Know: Explorations at the Edge of Knowledge  
Fourth Estate, 2016 
The author investigates how leading experts in fields from quantum physics 
and cosmology, to sensory perception and neuroscience, have articulated 
the current lie of the land. In doing so, he travels to the very boundaries of 
understanding, questioning contradictory stories and consulting cutting 
edge data. Is it possible that we will one day know everything? Or are there 
fields of research that will always lie beyond the bounds of human compre-
hension? And if so, how do we cope with living in a universe where there 
are things that will forever transcend our understanding? 
 
48                         ESSSAT News & Reviews, 26-3 September 2016   
 
Alister McGrath  
Re-Imagining Nature: The Promise of Christian Natural Theology 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2016  
Reimagining Nature is a new introduction to the fast developing area of 
natural theology, written by one of the world’s leading theologians. The 
text engages in serious theological dialogue whilst looking at how past de-
velopments might illuminate and inform theory and practice in the present. 
This text sets out to explore what a properly Christian approach to natural 
theology might look like and how this relates to alternative interpretations 
of our experience of the natural world, feeding into current debates about 
the relationship between science and religion. 
 
Travis M. Stevick 
Encountering Reality 
Fortress Press, 2016  
The book argues for a new appreciation of T. F. Torrance on epistemology 
and reality. According to Torrance’s realism, all authentic knowledge in-
volves the nature of the object impressing its inherent rationality on the 
mind. Consequently, knowledge involves thinking in accordance with the 
nature of the object. Stevick explores the place and function of “ultimate 
beliefs” in epistemology, as well as the question as to whether such beliefs 
imply a retreat to either foundationalism or fideism. The inescapability of 
ultimate beliefs in all human knowledge requires a shift in the traditional 
notion of objectivity. 
 
Sean Carroll 
The Big Picture: On the Origins of Life, Meaning, and the Universe Itself 
Dutton, 2016 
Sean Carroll beautifully articulates the world view suggested by contempo-
rary naturalism.  Thorny issues like free will, the direction of time, and the 
source of morality are clarified with elegance and insight.  The Big Pic-
ture shows how the scientific worldview enriches our understanding of the 
universe and ourselves. A reliable account of our knowledge of the uni-
verse, it is also a serene meditation on our need for meaning, which can be 
achieved without theistic beliefs. 
 
Stephen M. Barr 
The Believing Scientist: Essays on Science and Religion 
Eerdmans, 2016 
The author addresses a wide range of questions about the relationship be-
tween science and religion, providing a beautiful picture of how they can 
coexist in harmony. In his first essay, he challenges the widely held idea 
that there is an inherent conflict between science and religion. He goes on 
to analyze such topics as the quantum creation of universes from nothing, 
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the multiverse, the Intelligent Design movement, and the implications of 
neuroscience for the reality of the soul. 
 
Cosmological issues  
 
Judith L. Corey  
Light from Light: Cosmology and the Theology of the Logos 
Fortress Press, 2016  
Cosmology and theology share a long-held relationship with one another, 
explaining as they do the constitution of the world and the interaction of 
forces. The author explores the history of this relationship, from ancient 
prescientific and theological explanations through contemporary science 
and philosophy. In this history, a particular problem is highlighted by the 
author: the prevalence of dualism – from Aristotelian philosophy to modern 
mechanistic conceptions, many of these accounts presume a sharp, absolute 
dichotomy between matter and spirit, and the material world and the divine 
.  
Robert B. Stewart   
God and Cosmology: William Lane Craig and Sean Carroll in Dialogue 
Fortress Press, 2016  
The question of God and cosmology is far from abstract. Structured as a 
debate, the 2014 Greer-Heard Forum focused on the issue of God and cos-
mology and its impact on life and self-understanding. Christian philosopher 
William Lane Craig and atheist cosmologist Sean Carroll presented their 
views before a packed crowd of more than nine hundred people. Spirited, 
civil, and often humorous, the debate highlighted not only their positions, 
but the full range of possibilities. 
 
Paul Wallace  
Stars Beneath Us: Finding God in the Evolving Cosmos 
Fortress Press, 2016  
In ways both confident and gentle, Stars Beneath Us brilliantly shows 
God’s presence in the ever-evolving cosmos. Relying on his upbringing as a 
Baptist, his doctoral work in experimental nuclear physics and gamma-ray 
astronomy, and his ordination to the gospel ministry in the Cooperative 
Baptist Fellowship, Paul Wallace weaves a book unlike any other in faith-
and-science literature. Instead of engaging the debates of natural theology 
or proofs for the existence of God, this is a call to courage for those who 








Gregg A. Ten Elshof, Steven L. Porter & Thomas M. Crisp (Eds.) 
Neuroscience and the Soul: The Human Person in Philosophy, Science 
and theology 
Eerdmans, 2016 
In this book fourteen distinguished scholars grapple with current debates 
about the existence and nature of the soul. Featuring a dialogical format, the 
book presents state-of-the-art work by leading philosophers and theologians 
– some arguing for the existence of the soul, others arguing against – and 
then puts those scholars into conversation with critics of their views. Bring-
ing philosophy, theology, and neuroscience together in this way brings to 
light new nuances and significantly advances the ongoing debate over body 
and soul 
 
New scientific study of religion 
 
Smith, Aaron C. T.  
Cognitive Mechanisms of Belief Change.  
Palgrave Macmillan, 2016 
Belief change lies at the heart of all human aspirations. Beliefs guide our 
lives and to a great extent, determine our success, satisfaction and happi-
ness. The book explains how certain ideas and concepts steal a place in the 
mind because they latch on to hardwired ways of thinking, experiencing, 
and behaving. Concepts throw light upon the mind’s desires, which in turn 
casts a kaleidoscope of silhouettes against the walls of thought, with those 
taking distinct shape forging the outlines for beliefs to inhabit. Beliefs are 
critical to our sense of meaning and identity. 
Ina Wunn, Davina Grojnowski 
Ancestors, Territoriality, and Gods: A Natural History of Religion 
Springer, 2016 
This books sets out to explain how and why religion came into being. In 
contrast to the current, but incomplete approaches from disciplines such as 
cognitive science and psychology, the present authors adopt a new ap-
proach, equally manifest and constructive, that explains the origins of reli-
gion based strictly on behavioural biology. They employ accepted research 
results that remove all need for speculation. Decisive factors for the earliest 
demonstrations of religion are thus territorial behaviour and ranking, coping 
with existential fears, and conflict resolution with the help of rituals.  
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Brian J. McVeigh    
How Religion Evolved: Explaining the Living Dead, Talking Idols, and 
Mesmerizing Monuments  
Transaction, 2016 
The author offer an updating of “bicameralism.” First proposed by the psy-
chologist Julian Jaynes, this theory postulates that an earlier mentality ex-
isted: a “human” (the brain’s left hemisphere) heard voices of “gods” or 
“ancestors” (the brain’s right hemisphere). Therefore, ancient religious texts 
reporting divine voices were recountings of audiovisual hallucinations—a 
method of social control when early populations expanded. As growing po-
litical economic complexity destabilized god-governed states in the late se-





George Zarkadakis   
In Our Own Image: Will artificial intelligence save or destroy us?  
Pegasus Books, 2016 
The book explains AI’s history, technology and potential; its manifestations 
in intelligent machines; its connections to neurology and consciousness, as 
well as what AI reveals about us as human beings.  In Our Own Im-
age argues that we are on the brink of a fourth industrial revolution – poised 
to enter the age of Artificial Intelligence as science fiction becomes science 
fact. Ultimately, Zarkadakis observes, the fate of AI has profound implica-
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Announcements 
6th Conference on “The Structure of Credition” 
Epistemology, Networks, and Translation 
Graz, 23rd – 26th of November 2016 
With the 6th conference on “The Structure of Credition” in 2016 we will 
start the second phase of the Credition Research Project. In the first phase 
we were interested in a broad approach to an understanding of the believing 
process in order to explore whether the model of ‘credition’ is appealing.  
In the second phase of the Credition Research Project we want to critically 
scrutinize the model of credition. Therefore we intend to invite colleagues 
to present critical remarks and stimulate its further elaboration. 
Coordination: 
Angel Hans-Ferdinand,  Rüdiger Seitz, Peter Holzer, and Anne Runehov  
Presenters: 
Hans A. Alma, Sabine Bergner, Ivan Collagè. Elpine Boer, Christoph Jäger, 
Ingrid Malm Lindberg, Laura Marschner, Lluis Oviedo, Ray Paloutzian, 
Armin Schnider, Aku Visala and Roman Zaviyskyy  





Invitation to participate in a survey on values in the study of religion 
(VISOR) 
The VISOR Project is grounded in our awareness that scholars in various 
disciplines who study religion have values of myriad sorts, some of which 
are at the very heart of their research and others tangential. We think it 
would be helpful for scholars who study religion – whether from religious 
studies, theology, anthropology, psychology, sociology, languages, biology, 
cognitive science, history, or other – to learn what their values are. Which 
ones are primary and secondary? Which are unimportant? Do values differ 
among scholars who teach in different kinds of institutions, e.g., a state uni-
versity versus a theological seminary? For more information and to fill the 
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